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The Limits of Lay Participation Reform in
Japanese Criminal Justice
DAVID T. JOHNSON1 AND DIMITRI VANOVERBEKE2
“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”
William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun (1951)

Introduction
This article assesses recent reforms in Japanese criminal justice. It
focuses on the effects of three new forms of lay participation that are
described in the other articles in this symposium: the lay judge trial system,
victim participation, and mandatory prosecution through citizen review of
non-charge decisions. We argue that while many things have been modified
in Japan’s criminal process, there is more continuity than change with respect
to criminal justice substance (who exercises control) and outcome (who gets
what). In this respect, the past is not really past in Japanese criminal justice.
Given that the main aim of the lay judge reform—Japan’s most ambitious
reform—was to “enhance the power and authority of the judiciary” by
increasing public trust in it,3 the reproduction of substance and outcome in
Japanese criminal justice is unsurprising.4 In that it has enhanced the authority
of the judiciary and the procuracy, it could even be called a conservative
success.
1. Professor of Sociology, University of Hawaii at Manoa.
2. Dimitri Vanoverbeke is a Professor of Japanese Studies and director of the Department of
Area Studies at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KU Leuven), a research university in Flanders,
Belgium. He is also the author of Juries in the Japanese Legal System: The Continuing Struggle
for Citizen Participation and Democracy (Routledge, 2015).
3. N. Yanase, Deliberative Democracy and the Japanese Saiban-in (Lay Judge) Trial System,
ASIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, 3 (2) (2016), 327, 333-334.
4. As Article 1 of the Lay Judge Law states, “… Through the participation in criminal
proceedings of lay assessors, who have been selected from among the people, with judges, this
legislation seeks to contribute to the promotion of the public’s understanding of the judicial system
and thereby raise their confidence in it.” For an annotated translation of this law, see K. Anderson
& E. Saint, Japan’s Quasi-Jury (Saiban-in) Law: An Annotated Translation of the Act Concerning
Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials, ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW AND POLICY JOURNAL, 6
(2005), 233.
439
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We acknowledge that Japan’s lay judge reform has had some “prodefendant” effects.5 For example, there has been a slight rise in the acquittal
rate for defendants charged with serious crimes. There have been declines
in use of the two most severe criminal sanctions: life sentences and death
sentences. There has been a rise in the percentage of suspended sentences
with probation. There has been a drop in the percentage of cases booked by
police that end up being charged by prosecutors. There has been an increase
in the willingness of judges to deny prosecutors’ requests for the detention
of suspects and defendants. And there has been a rise in the percentage of
detainees released on bail before a trial verdict is issued.6
In addition to these small-to-modest changes in substance, the lay judge
reform has induced a “wide range” of “transformational” effects in Japanese
criminal procedure. 7 One prominent analyst has concluded that “many
issues remain, but when one thinks back on the situation at the time the new
system was introduced, the level of success is quite remarkable.”8 On this
view, the lay judge system has created more respect for the presumption of
innocence, 9 a perception that is shared by some other observers. 10 It
has made prosecutors more cautious about charging borderline cases, and
hence may be preventing some wrongful convictions.11 It has led to more

5. RIEKO KAGE, WHO JUDGES? DESIGNING JURY SYSTEMS IN JAPAN, EAST ASIA, AND
EUROPE (Cambridge University Press 2017), p. 6.
6. Kage, 2017, pp. 175, 202.
7. M. Inouye, Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials and Reformation of Criminal Justice
in Japan, United Nations Asia and Far East Institute, RESOURCE MATERIAL NR. 105 (2018) 74115.
8. D. H. Foote, Citizen Participation: Appraising the saiban’in system, MICHIGAN STATE
INT’L L. REV., 22.3 (2014) 755, 763.
9. Foote, supra note 8, 764.
10. M. Takeda, ‘Zaimei ochi’ hinpatsu, kisoritsu teika [‘Charge Rate Reduced’ Frequent,
Declining Indictment Rate], KŌCHI SHIMBUN, Kenshō Saiban’in seido jūnen [Assessing: One
Decade of the Lay Judge System] (Part 1), (Jan. 30, 2019) 12. The other articles in Takeda’s series
of five are as follows: M. Takeda, Utagawashiki wa muzai, tettei, Yūzairitsu teika: risshō mujun
tsuk [Innocent in case of doubt: bringing it home; Declining guilty verdicts, contradictions in the
evidence], FUKUI SHIMBUN, Kenshō Saiban’in seido jūnen [Assessing: One Decade of the Lay
Judge System] (Part 2), (Mar. 3, 2019) 19; M. Takeda, ‘Genbatsuka no ippō de yūyo ōku; ‘Kōi
sekinin’ tettei, ryōkei ni haba [Increasing punitiveness and also probation; Bringing the
‘responsibility for actions’ home, wide range in sentences], KYOTO SHIMBUN, Kenshō Saiban’in
seido jūnen [Assessing: One Decade of the Lay Judge System] (Part 3), (Mar. 23, 2019) 6; M.
Takeda, Nagabiku hyōgi 13 jikan ni, chokusetsu shinri e, shōko heri shōnin baizō [The deliberations
are dragging on to 13 hours, towards direct trials, fewer evidence, double as many witnesses],
YAMAGATA SHIMBUN, Kenshō Saiban’in seido jūnen [Assessing: One Decade of the Lay Judge
System] (Part 4), (Apr. 25, 2019) 6; M. Takeda, Jitai ka kesseki 8 wari chikaku, shinri chōkika nado
yōin: shuhi gimu keiken tsutaerarezu [Declining or default for more than 80 per cent, the extension
of the deliberation as one of the contributing factors], KAHOKU SHIMPO, Kenshō Saiban’in seido
jūnen [Assessing: One Decade of the Lay Judge System] (Part 5), (May 22, 2019) 25.
11. Foote, supra note 8, 765.
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appropriately harsh sentences for some persons convicted of sex crimes.12 It
has led to more use of suspended sentences, which may encourage
rehabilitation.13 And though the evidence is thin, it may have enriched trial
deliberations about guilt and sentence by requiring judges to interact with
citizens, who have different life experiences and perspectives than do their
professional counterparts on the bench.14 More broadly, Japan’s lay judge
reform is significant because it provided the opening for other major reforms
in Japan’s criminal justice system, including the strengthening of the defense
counsel function, expanded discovery, and increases in the electronic
recording of interrogations.15
One advocate for increasing lay participation in Japanese criminal
justice has identified six significant procedural changes that were stimulated
by the country’s lay judge reform.16 The first two refer to changes in defense
lawyering that are invigorating an “unbalanced” adversary system that has
long tilted toward the interests of the state.17
(a) A new public defender system provides criminal suspects
with legal representation before indictment (higisha
kokusenbengo seido).
12. Foote, supra note 8, 766.
13. Foote, supra note 8, 766.
14. Foote, supra note 8, 767.
15. Foote, supra note 8, 773.
16. S. Shinomiya, Kokumin no shutaiteki, jisshitsuteki sanka wa jitsugen shiteiru ka:
Saiban’in seido shikkō jūnen to kongo no kadai [Has the participation of the citizens in an
independent and a substantial way become a reality? One decade since the implementation of the
lay judge system and future issues, (special issue: welcoming a decade of implementation of the
lay judge system)], JIYŪ TO SEIGI, 70, 5 (2019), 8-17.
17. M. FEELEY & S. MIYAZAWA, (EDS.), THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT:
CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS (Palgrave 2002). As described by Takano and Takayama,
two of Japan’s leading defense attorneys, the lay judge reform has had several positive effects on
criminal defense, including these: (1) it has made trials less dependent on dossiers composed by
police and prosecutors during pre-trial investigations in which defense lawyers are largely absent,
and it has made trials more reliant on the direct and oral testimony of witnesses in open court; (2)
it has made defense lawyers more active and aggressive in lay judge trials, a change that has had
spill-over effects in non-lay judge trials; and (3) it has stimulated the creation of an improved
system for the disclosure of evidence to the defense (T. Takano, Saiban’in seido no kōka: 10 nen o
furikaette (tokushu saiban’in saiban shikkō 10 nen o mukaete) [The Impact of the Lay Judge
System: Looking back on a Decade (special issue: welcoming a decade of implementation of the
lay judge system)], JIYŪ TO SEIGI, 70, 5 (May 2019) 18-29; I. Takayama, Hikokunin no tame no
saiban’in saiban ga jitsugen dekiteiru ka: korekara no jūnen ni mukete jūnen o furikaeru (tokushu
saiban’in saiban shikkō jūnen o mukaete) [Has the trial for the accused become a reality? Looking
back on a decade for the next decade (special issue: welcoming a decade of implementation of the
lay judge system)], JIYŪ TO SEIGI, 70, 5 (2019), 30-36. On the prospects for change in Japanese
criminal defense lawyering, see David T. Johnson, War in a Season of Slow Revolution: Defense
Lawyers and Lay Judges in Japanese Criminal Justice, ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL, Volume 9, Issue
26 (June 29, 2011), pp. 1-11.

6 - Johnson

442

7/29/2020 10:19 AM

Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment

[Vol. 1:3

(b) There is increased specialization in criminal defense
lawyering (keiji bengo no senmonka).
(c) A more formal pretrial process was created, with expanded
rights of discovery for defendants to the evidence in prosecutors’
possession (kōhan mae seiri tetsuzuki to shōko kaiji).
(d) Lay judge trials proceed more continuously and rapidly
than traditional trials did (renjitsu teki kaitei).
(e) There is more reliance on the principles of “directness”
and “orality” at trial, and there is less reliance on written dossiers
as evidence (kōhan ni okeru chokusetsushugi—kōtōshugi no
tettei). As a result, trials are easier to understand and more
interesting to watch.
(f) There is greater transparency in interrogations, largely
because they are electronically recorded (torishirabe no kashika).
The same analyst believes there have also been significant changes in
Japan’s “judicial mindset” (saibankan no maindosetto no henka), 18 with
judges becoming less deferential to the interests of law enforcement. In his
view, this is the most important consequences of Japan’s lay judge reform,
for the country’s judiciary has long taken a “conservative” stance on criminal
justice issues.19 Indeed, the Japanese judiciary has “adopted, accepted or
silently acquiesced in a wide range of interpretations that greatly
circumscribed the protections for suspects and defendants, while granting
broad authority to the investigators.”20 The presence of lay judges may be
slowly transforming judicial sensibilities in ways that are making the
criminal justice system more fair and just—especially to suspects and
defendants. It will take many more years to make a sound assessment of the
full effects of Japan’s lay judge reform, but in the long run this view might
be right. The fresh eyes of the amateur are important because, in law as in
life, the more one looks at a thing, the less one is able to see it. As G. K.
Chesterton observed a century ago:
It is a terrible business to mark a man out for the vengeance
of men. But it is a thing to which a man can grow accustomed, as
he can to other terrible things … The horrible thing about all legal
officials—even the best—about all judges, magistrates, barristers,
detectives, and policemen, is not that they are wicked (some of
them are good), and not that they are stupid (several of them are
18.
19.

Shinomiya, 2019.
D. H. Foote, Policymaking by the Japanese Judiciary in the Criminal Justice Field,
HŌSHAKAIGAKU, No. 72 (2010), 18.
20. Foote, 2010, 17-18.
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quite intelligent). It is simply that they have got used to it.
Strictly, they do not see the prisoner in the dock; all they see is the
usual man in the usual place. They do not see the awful court of
judgment; they only see their own workshop.21
Lay participation in Japanese criminal justice could correct the judicial
tendency to see “the awful court of judgment” as one’s own familiar
workshop. 22 And some defense lawyers seem to be realizing that in the
presence of lay judges, they are no longer “talking to a wall.”23 They are
even starting to “rattle the cages” of judicial interpretation that have long
constrained the practice of criminal defense.24 Moreover, in Japan there have
not been major reform failures of the kind that have been common in
American criminal justice—and lay participation in Japan has not made
things worse.25 In recognizing this we do not mean to damn Japan with faint
praise. From an American perspective, heeding the Hippocratic Oath—“first,
do no harm”—by avoiding the potentially iatrogenic effects of reform is no
small achievement.26
Still, on the presently available evidence, after ten years of lay judge
trials and “high praise and acclaim from nearly all quarters” for the effects
of this reform,27 our conclusion is that there is more continuity than change
in the “mindsets” and practices of Japanese judges and prosecutors. As the
next section describes, these legal professionals have circumscribed the
influence of ordinary citizens in a variety of ways, much as legal
professionals did in response to previous reforms (such as the prewar jury
system) that aimed to establish meaningful forms of lay involvement.28 We
want to stress (again) that it will take more time to discern the full effects of
Japan’s lay participation reforms. But if the proof of reform is mainly in the

21. G. K. Chesterton, The Twelve Men, in TREMENDOUS TRIFLES, 1909.
22. In 1914, one of Japan’s most famous novelists seemed to echo Chesterton’s insight. In an
essay on art and experts, Natsume Sōseki noted that the senses of specialists eventually become
dull, which is why they need the help of lay people, who “only get a clear view of Mount Fuji when
standing far away from it.” See N. Sōseki, Shirōto to Kurōto [Amateurs and Experts], in NATSUME
SŌSEKI ZENSHŪ [NATSUME SŌSEKI’S COLLECTED WORKS] (Kadokawa Shoten, Volume 11, 7th
edition, 1967), 224–255.
23. Johnson, 2011.
24. Johnson, 2011.
25. Malcolm M. Feeley, East Asian Court Reform on Trial: Comments on the Contributions,
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL, 27 (2017), 273, 292.
26. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (Basic
Books, 1983).
27. M. J. WILSON, H. FUKURAI & T. MARUTA, JAPAN AND CIVIL JURY TRIALS: THE
CONVERGENCE OF FORCES (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), p. 38.
28. DIMITRI VANOVERBEKE, JURIES IN THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: THE CONTINUING
STRUGGLE FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY (Routledge, 2015), pp. 60-87.
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pudding, then we need to conclude that not all that much has yet changed in
Japanese criminal justice.

The Limits of Form
Evaluations of Japan’s lay participation reforms tend to converge on two
main conclusions. They are believed to have produced major changes in
Japanese criminal justice, and the changes are seen as welcome and
progressive. 29 In our view, these assessments are too positive about the
scope and impact of reform, and they tend to conflate process with substance.
This section—the heart of our article—identifies ten ways in which Japan’s
lay participation reforms are limited and problematic.30
1. A Sliver of Cases
Japan’s Lay Judge Law states that lay judge panels shall hear cases in
two categories: (a) crimes that are punishable by death, imprisonment for an
indefinite period, or imprisonment with hard labor; and (b) crimes in which
29. There are dissenting views. For example, Igarashi Futaba argues that Japan’s lay judge
system must confront “two crises” or it will become an empty and “hollowed out” reform: (a) the
failure to provide adequate due process to criminal suspects and defendants, and (b) the failure to
really reflect citizens’ opinions in criminal justice decision-making (F. Igarashi, Kō Naosanakereba
Saiban’in Saiban wa Kūdō ni Naru (Gendaijinbunsha, 2016), pp. 3-15. Similarly, Mark Levin
argues that “the more things change [with respect to Japanese criminal justice], the more things
stay the same” (Plus Ça Change, Plus C’est la Même Chose), and he concludes that Japanese
criminal justice reform has taken “two steps forward and five steps backward” (Mark A. Levin,
Considering Japanese Criminal Justice from an Original Position, in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN (J. Liu and S. Miyazawa eds.) Springer Series on Asian Criminology
and Criminal Justice Research, (Springer, 2018), pp. 173-188). And Matthew J. Wilson
observes that lay judge trials occur in only a handful of cases, and officials seem inordinately
interested in their “halo effect,” for they stress the public support lay judge trials have generated
for Japanese criminal justice and the sense of efficacy people feel after serving as lay judges, while
paying little attention to whether the lay judge system has actually shifted power relations among
prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys (M. J. Wilson, Assessing the Direct and Indirect Impact
of Citizen Participation in Serious Criminal Trials in Japan, PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL,
27 (2017) 102-104). Note, however, that Wilson also believes reform has brought important
benefits to Japanese society. As he summarizes, “From the outset, the creation and implementation
of the lay judge system have been strongly controlled by the status quo such that direct impact on
the outcome of individual criminal trials has been minimized. However, the value of this
monumental court reform in Japan has been educational, indirect, and real” (M. J. Wilson,
Assessing the Direct and Indirect Impact of Citizen Participation in Serious Criminal Trials in
Japan, PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL, 27 (2017) 75). In limit 10 of this section we will
argue that the “educational” and “indirect” effects of Japan’s lay judge reform are far from
“monumental.”
30. The ten limits of lay participation reform can be placed in three categories: problems
inherent in the reforms (1 and 2), changes that consolidate the status quo (3, 7, and 8), and little or
no change (4-6 and 9-10).
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a victim has died because of an intentional criminal act. These two
categories might seem to constitute a large slice of Japan’s criminal justice
pie, but it is actually just a sliver. In 2017, for example, 1122 persons were
charged with criminal offenses that were eligible for a lay judge trial. This
was 4 percent more than the 1077 persons similarly charged in 2016, but just
1.6 percent of the total number of persons (69,674) charged with crimes in
Japan in 2017 (see Table 1). For every person indicted for a lay judge trial,
approximately 60 people are indicted for non-lay judge trials. Global
descriptions of change in “Japanese criminal justice” based on less than two
percent of the system’s caseload are as dubious as accounts of life in San
Francisco based on the lifestyles of the rich and famous Potrero Hill or
Presidio Heights. Similarly, predictions that the lay judge reform will have
a “profound effect on Japanese criminal justice” fail to recognize that a sliver
of a slice is not the whole pie.31
TABLE 1 Ratio of Lay Judge Trial Indictments to Total Number of
Criminal Indictments, 2009-2017
YEAR

LAY-JUDGE
INDICTMENTS PERCENTAGE
TRIAL
TOTAL (2)
OF 1/2
INDICTMENTS
(1)

2009

1196

96,541

1.23

2010

1797

91,322

1.96

2011

1785

85,586

2.08

2012

1457

83,823

1.84

2013

1465

78,774

1.85

2014

1393

77,405

1.79

2015

1333

77,268

1.72

2016

1077

73,060

1.47

2017

1122

69,674

1.61

31.

M. Inouye, 2018, p. 74.
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Note: Lay Judge Trial Indictments are calculated from various reports published
by Japan’s Supreme Court 裁判員制度の実施状況について【データ】[About the
Implementation Status of the Lay Judge System: Data], retrieved at
http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/topics/09_12_05-10jissi_jyoukyou.html; and
total indictments are calculated from 犯 罪 ⽩ 書 [White Paper on Crime],
retrieved at http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/65/nfm/n65_2_2_2_3_0.html#h2-2-302, figure 2-2-3-02.

Descriptions of Japan’s new trial system commonly claim that lay judge
panels hear “serious criminal cases” or “heinous criminal cases” (or the like).
This linguistic shorthand is handy, but it misstates the matter, for nearly all
criminal cases are “serious” in the sense that they result in some combination
of incarceration, fine, supervision, tracking, marking, stigmatization, or
life disruption. 32 In Japan, simply getting arrested can have catastrophic
consequences—regardless of the offense severity, and even when arrest does
not lead to indictment. One pernicious myth about criminal justice is that
“minor arrests and convictions are not especially terrible for the people who
experience them.”33 In Japan as in the United States, this fiction is callous
to the many people whose lives are adversely impacted by contact with the
criminal process. It also contributes to the tendency to conflate Japanese
“criminal justice” with the “lay judge system,” for when the stakes are
mistakenly seen to be low, why bother to discover what actually happens in
the other criminal courthouses? Most importantly, the myth of the “minor
matter” functions to normalize the “punitive and vexatious” ways in which
so-called “petty” (bizai) cases are processed in the nether regions of Japanese
criminal justice, where lay judges do not serve and journalists and scholars
seldom tread.34 Thanks to research by Japanese reporters and scholars, we
now know a lot about how Japan’s lay judge system is operating. But we
need to be honest about our ignorance, too. The truth is, we know little about
how the rest of Japanese criminal justice system is (or is not) working.35
Ignorance is ignorance, and no right to believe anything can be inferred
from it.
Lay judge trials are not only a small sliver of all criminal cases in Japan;
they also do not adjudicate many of the country’s most serious crimes. In

32. A. NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR
SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE INEQUAL (Basic Books, 2018).
33. Id., at p. 19.
34. A. Peters, Some comparative observations on the criminal justice process in Holland and
Japan, JOURNAL OF THE JAPAN-NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE 4 (1992) 247-294, 291.
35. Igarashi, 2016.
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2016, all of the ten most frequently tried lay judge offenses were street
crimes even though corporate crime, white-collar crime, and corruption
are widely considered the country’s most serious crime problems.36 In this
respect, the lay judge system reflects and reinforces a troubling dualism in
Japanese criminal justice: police and prosecutors are enabled to “make
crimes” against offenders for most ordinary street crimes, 37 but they are
disabled from holding accountable many of the country’s most powerful and
harmful actors.38 And in this sense, lay judge trials reinforce Japan’s “legal
cobweb,” which catches small flies but let’s wasps and hornets break through
(to paraphrase Jonathan Swift in A Tritical Essay upon the Faculties of the
Mind, 1707).
Japan also has serious problems with sexual assault and other crimes of
sexual violence and aggression.39 Yet another large lacuna in Japan’s lay
judge system is the exclusion of most serious sex offenses from its
jurisdiction. In 2017, for example, there were 115 lay judge trials for
“forcible indecency resulting in death or injury,” 75 lay judge trials for
“sexual assault resulting in death or injury,” and 10 lay judge trials for
“robbery-rape.” In total, these 200 sex offenses comprise 18.6 percent of all
lay judge trials (1077) in that year, but they represent only a small fraction
of all serious sex crimes.40 In 2017, Japan’s Penal Code was revised to make
the first significant changes in its sex crime provisions since 1907. The
revised Penal Code now defines various sex “crimes” under Articles 174179 and Articles 181 and 241, and “attempted [sex] crimes” (misuizai) under
Articles 176-179. But the only crimes eligible for lay judge trial are defined
in Article 181 (forcible indecency resulting in death or injury) and Article

36. See, for example, ALAN S. MILLER & SATOSHI KANAZAWA, ORDER BY ACCIDENT: THE
ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CONFORMITY IN JAPAN (Westview Press, 2000), ch. 7; David T.
Johnson, Kumo no Su ni Shōchō Sareru Nihonhō no Tokushoku (Japan’s Legal Cobweb), JURISUTO
(The Jurist, Special Edition on the 50th Anniversary of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure,
No. 1148 (January 1-15, 1999), pp. 185-189; DAG LEONARDSEN, CRIME IN JAPAN: PARADISE
LOST? (Springer, 2010), p. 13; MATTHEW M. CARLSON & STEVEN R. REED, POLITICAL
CORRUPTION AND SCANDALS IN JAPAN (Cornell, 2018).
37. SETSUO MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN: A STUDY ON MAKING CRIME (SUNY Press,
1992); DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN
(Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 33-42.
38. David T. Johnson, Kumo no Su ni Shōchō Sareru Nihonhō no Tokushoku, JŪRISUTO, No.
1148 (January 1-15, 1999), pp. 185-189; David T. Johnson, Nihon no ‘Kumo no Su’ Shihō to
Kensatsu no Katsudō, in KEIJI SHIHŌ O NINAU HITOBITO (Volume 3 in the series Keiji Shihō o
Kangaeru, Iwanami Shoten, 2017) (Ibusuki Makoto et al. eds.), pp. 29-51.
39. CATHERINE BURNS, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND THE LAW IN JAPAN (Routledge, 2005); ITOH
SHIORI, BLACK BOX (Bungei Sunju, 2017).
40. Chizuko Ueno, 2018. See also, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2019/06/5fbad0a
24182-feature-feminist-scholar-calls-japans-gender-problem-human-disaster.html.
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241 (robbery and forcible sexual intercourse resulting in death).41 In law,
other sex offenses are not deemed sufficiently serious to qualify for lay judge
trial.42 Until the Penal Code revision of 2017, “gang rape” (shudangōkanzai)
was not eligible for lay judge trial, and neither was “robbery-rape”
(gōtōgōkanzai) if the rape occurred before the robbery. Even after the 2017
revision, simple rape (“forced intercourse”) and “intercourse or indecent
behavior by a custodian” (Article 179) remain ineligible for lay judge trial.
As for crimes of sexual molestation (chikan), which are ubiquitous in
Japan,43 the vast majority are excluded from lay judge trial because they are
charged under local ordinances in which the maximum punishment is
typically set at 1 year (as in Tokyo) or 6 months (as in many other
prefectures).
If lay judge trials are supposed to rely on “citizen sensibilities” for
making judgments about “the most serious crimes,” then the exclusion of the
vast majority of sex crimes from the new trial system illustrates the ironies
and contradictions of Japan’s “legal cobweb.”44 Some commentators have
argued for broadening the scope of lay judge trials, so as to encompass more
cases (including sex crimes and white-collar offenses), but to date, most
reform efforts have focused on narrowing the scope of eligible offenses, not
expanding it.45
2. Where Are the Police?
Various labels have been used to characterize criminal justice in Japan.
“Precise justice” (seimitsu shihō) and “prosecutor justice” (kensatsu shihō)
are two of the most familiar,46 but “police justice” (keisatsu shihō) may be
41. Emails from Hakuoh University Professor of Law Mari Hirayama, July 26, 2019, and
August 9, 2019.
42. Mari Hirayama, Lay judge decisions in sex crime cases: The most controversial area of
saiban-in trials, YONSEI LAW JOURNAL, 3 (2012) 128; Mari Hirayama, A Future Prospect of
Criminal Justice Policy for Sex Crimes in Japan-the Roles of the Lay Judge System There, in CRIME
AND J USTICE IN CONTEMPORARY J APAN, (J. Liu & S. Miyazawa eds.) Springer Series on
Asian Criminology and Criminal Justice Research (Springer, 2018), pp. 303-317.
43. SAITŌ AKIYOSHI, OTOKO GA CHIKAN NI NARU RIYŪ (Isuto Puresu, 2017).
44. David T. Johnson, Nihon no ‘Kumo no Su’: Shihō to Kensatsu Katsudō, in KEIJI SHIHŌ O
NINAU HITOBITO, (Makoto Ibusuki et al. eds.) (Volume 3 in the series Keiji Shihō o Kangaeru;
Mari Hirayama trans., Iwanami Shoten, 2017), pp. 29-51.
45. I. Takayama, Hikokunin no tame no saiban’in saiban ga jitsugen dekiteiru ka: korekara
no jūnen ni mukete jūnen o furikaeru (tokushu saiban’in saiban shikkō jūnen o mukaete) [Has the
trial for the accused become a reality? Looking back on a decade for the next decade (special issue:
welcoming a decade of implementation of the lay judge system)], JIYŪ TO SEIGI, 70, 5 (2019), pp.
30-36.
46. One of the defining features of “precise justice” (seimitsu shihō) and “prosecutor justice”
(kensatsu shihō) is reliance on detailed dossiers composed during pretrial investigations (David T.
Johnson, 2002, pp. 264-275). Although the lay judge reform has led to somewhat less reliance on
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the most telling. 47 Few democratic police forces are as powerful as the
Japanese police. 48 It is hard to say exactly, but half or more of all
discretion in Japanese criminal justice may be exercised by the police.49 In
the aggregate, what police do with their discretion strongly shapes the
content and quality of Japanese criminal justice. In this context, it is striking
how little attention has been directed at police in Japan’s justice reform
movement generally, and in its lay participation reforms specifically.
The fact that police seldom appear in Japan’s reform agenda is all the
more remarkable because there have been many recent innovations aimed at
making “lay and expert contributions” more salient and influential in
Japanese criminal justice.50 These include not only the lay judge system, the
victim participation system, and the reformed Prosecution Review
Commissions (the main foci of this symposium), but also an enhanced role
for forensic psychiatrists in making judgments about criminal insanity and
diminished responsibility, the provision by social workers of more “support
at the entrance” (iriguchi shien) for criminal suspects and defendants, and
the increased involvement of scientists in criminal justice fact-finding,
especially in assessing DNA and other forensic evidence.51 Japan’s recent
lay participation innovations also include a “boom” in crime prevention
activities by citizen volunteers.52 Yet despite this flurry of reform, there has
been little effort to make Japanese police more responsive and accountable
to the public that they ostensibly serve.
Citizen oversight of police has proven effective in other countries.53 In
this sense, police may be the biggest winner in Japan’s justice system reform
movement. They do not want their position—much power and little
accountability—to change, and they are getting what they want, largely
because they have been able to limit the scope of the political process to

dossiers (Masahiro Takeda, 2019b), many defense lawyers maintain that they continue to play too
large a role in criminal trials (Takano Takashi, 2019; I. Takayama, 2019).
47. David T. Johnson, Nihon ni okeru Shihō Seido Kaikaku: Keisatsu no Shozai to Sono
Jūyōsei [Justice System Reform in Japan: Where Are the Police and Why It Matters], HŌRITSU
JIHŌ, Volume 76, No. 2 (February 2004), pp. 8-15.
48. Setsuo Miyazawa, 1992; David T. Johnson, Retention and reform in Japanese capital
punishment, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 49 (2015) 853.
49. On the broad scope of police discretion in the United States, see KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (University of Illinois Press, 1969).
50. ERIK HERBER, LAY AND EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS TO JAPANESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(Routledge, 2019).
51. Herber, 2019.
52. Erik Herber, Crime prevention in Japan: orchestration, representation, and the impact of
a volunteering boom, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW, CRIME AND JUSTICE, 54 (2018), pp. 102110.
53. SAMUEL E. WALKER & CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY (Sage, 2018).
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consideration of those reform issues that are innocuous to them. 54 And
police power has long been evident in Japanese criminal justice reform. In
2001, eight years before lay judge trials started, Toshiki Odanaka observed
that important police issues were missing in the reform agenda. As he put it:
The opinion [of the Justice System Reform Council] stresses
the primary importance of a fair and rapid sentence but dismisses
the importance of a just procedure. Although the JSRC pursued
the expansion of investigation methods such as criminal immunity
and securing witness cooperation, it clearly states that it will not
direct efforts at the improvement of the police detention system
(including “substitute prisons,” or daiyo kangoku) or police
investigations … This is … the result of a political calculation
driven by ambition for power … The reform of justice described
in the [JSRC’s] opinion paper is obviously regressive against the
background of constitutional principles such as the protection of
human rights, the guarantee of independent justice, the right to a
fair trial, and the right to fair procedures.55
By keeping the issues of police power, performance, and accountability
outside the realm of public discussion, the constricted scope of criminal
justice reform in Japan illustrates a general truth about the roles played by
power and rationality in the reform process. As other studies have shown,
power has the capacity to define “reality” by producing knowledge that is
useful to it and by suppressing knowledge for which it has no use.56 Since
54. P. Bachrach & M. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW,
56.4 (1962) 941-952.
55. See T. Odanaka, Kompan no shihō seido kaikaku no ‘gyakukaikaku’ teki honshitsu [The
“Counter-Reformative” Essence of Today’s Judicial Reforms], HŌ TO MINSHUSHUGI, 360 (July
2001), pp. 36-38; and see Dimitri Vanoverbeke, 2015, p. 133 (quoting Odanaka). Concerns about
the police being overlooked and ignored by journalists and researchers were also expressed in Suo
Masayuki’s trenchant analysis of his experiences on a criminal justice reform commission (hōsei
shingikai) called the “Special Committee on Criminal Justice for a New Era” (shinjidai no keiji
shihō seido tokubetsu bukai). See M. SUO, SORE DEMO BOKU WA KAIGI DE TATAKAU:
DOKYUMENTO KEIJI SHIHŌ KAIKAKU [EVEN SO I WILL FIGHT IN COMMITTEE: REPORTAGE ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM] (Iwanami Shoten, 2015). Although this book is a harshly critical
examination of Japan’s reform process, in a 2019 interview Suo expressed positive views about the
effects of lay participation, saying “I had hoped the lay judge reform would go well, but there are
aspects of it that are going even better than I expected, and some things [in Japanese criminal
justice] have improved dramatically.” A summary of Suo’s views even states that there has been
“great progress” (daishinpo) in Japanese criminal justice as a result of the lay judge reform. See
the interview by Otani Akihiro, in Fuji News Network & Tōkai Terebi (Aug. 17, 2019), https://
www.fnn.jp/posts/00047349HDK/201909301712_THK_HDK?fbclid=IwAR3TWszdd_VgD524BfibWCCav5D0yo0JUMn1ebzdm8dvJR6S1IkPBxogjo (retrieved October 20, 2019).
56. BENT FLYVBJERG, RATIONALITY AND POWER: DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE (University of
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at least the time of the Occupation (1945-1952), Japanese police have been
extraordinarily successful at producing rationalizations that serve their
interest and suppressing rationality that would challenge their position of
primacy in criminal justice. 57 Despite many lay participation reforms in
recent years, this crucial fact has not changed.58 This limit of reform and the
next one (on prosecutors) suggest that lay participation reforms have had
relatively little impact on some of Japanese law enforcement’s most
fundamental features.
3. An Abundance of Prosecutorial Caution
One axiom about criminal court reform is that it matters how reforms are
implemented. Another is that court reform routinely has unintended
consequences.59 The most important consequence of Japan’s lay judge reform
concerns how prosecutors have tried to implement and resist it—with an
abundance of charging caution. Although many Japanese reformers did not
anticipate this result, in retrospect it seems unsurprising, for prosecutors have
long used their discretion to control the inputs into Japan’s criminal
courtrooms, and they are reluctant to relinquish this gatekeeper role.60
From January to May of 2019, Kyodo News journalist Masahiro Takeda
wrote a series of five newspaper articles entitled “Ten Years of the Lay Judge
Chicago Press, 1998), p. 36.
57. Christopher Aldous& F. Leishman, Policing in post-war Japan: reform, reversion and
reinvention, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, 25.2 (1997), pp. 135-154.
58. One consequence of marginalizing police in Japan’s reform process is a continued reliance
on confessions in the criminal justice system (D. H. Foote, Confessions and the Right to Silence in
Japan, GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (1991) 415; Miyazawa,
1992). But there have been noteworthy changes as well. For example, more criminal suspects and
defendants are invoking their right to remain silent. The length of interrogations has declined in
recent years. And as of June 2019, interrogations must be recorded in all cases involving lay judges.
Despite significant loopholes, the recording requirement increases the transparency of a police (and
prosecutor) practice that has long been problematic (D. Johnson, 2002, ch.8). At the same time,
electronic recording creates a new concern, that video evidence of the interrogation process will
“mislead” lay judge panels (Makoto Ibusuki, The Dark Side of Visual Recording in the Suspect
Interview: An Empirical and Experiential Study of the Unexpected Impact of Video Images,
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW, 2019, pp. 1-17, at https://link.springer.
com/article/10.1007%2Fs11196-019-09645-0), and “over-influence” their decisions (Toshikuni
Murai and Keiichi Muraoka, www.nippon.com, June 26, 2019, https://www. nippon.com/en/japantopics/c05402/citizens-on-the-bench-assessing-japan%E2%80%99s-lay-jud ge-system.html). The
use of video recordings in the “Imaichi” kidnap-murder trial in Utsunomiya District Court
illustrates the potentially pro-law enforcement effects of Japan’s recording reform (Setsuo
Miyazawa & Mari Hirayama, Introduction of Videotaping of Interrogations and the Lessons of the
Imaichi Case: A Case of Conventional Criminal Justice Policy-Making in Japan, PACIFIC RIM LAW
& POLICY JOURNAL, 27 (2017) 149).
59. Feeley, 1983.
60. Johnson, 2002.
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System” (Saiban’in Seido 10 nen). The first article in this series makes his
most important point—one he has been making for several years.61 Its title
is “Crimes Often Reduced as Charge Rate Declines: Some See Prosecutor
Caution as ‘Tight-Assed’” (“‘Zaimei-ochi’ Hinpatsu Kisoritsu Teika:
Kensatsu Shinchō ‘Shirigomi’ Shiteki mo”).62 In this article, Takeda observes
that in 2004 (the year the Lay Judge Law was passed), 3800 criminal cases
would have been eligible for lay judge trial. In the same year, the Justice
System Reform Council said it expected there to be approximately 3000 lay
judge trials per year after the Law took effect in 2009. That prediction badly
missed the mark. In fact, only 2133 criminal cases were eligible for lay judge
trial in 2009, and by 2016 the number had fallen to 1122—less than 30
percent of the number that would have been eligible in 2004.
There are two main reasons for this large drop in the number of cases
eligible for lay judge trial. First, crime rates in Japan have declined. From
2004 to 2017, the homicide rate declined by 36 percent, the robbery rate
declined by 76 percent, and the total number of Penal Code offenses declined
by 73 percent. These and other crimes declined partly because of
demographics: the graying of Japanese society means there are fewer young
people in the crime-prone years. The second reason for the sharp decline in
the number of “object cases for lay judge trial” (saiban’in saiban no taishō
jiken) is increased “prosecutor caution” (kensatsu shinchō), which comes in
two types: (a) charging cases received from the police lightly, by reducing
the offense severity (zaimei-ochi jiken); and (b) not charging cases at all (kiso

61. M. Takeda, 2019a.
62. M. Takeda, 2019a = “‘Zaimei ochi’ hinpatsu, kisoritsu teika” [‘Charge Rate Reduced’
Frequent, Declining Indictment Rate], Kōchi Shimbun, Kenshō Saiban’in seido jūnen [Assessing:
One Decade of the Lay Judge System] (Part 1), (January 30, 2019), p. 12. Consider three Japanese
expressions that have been used to criticize prosecutorial caution in charging cases for lay judge
trial. First, the Japanese characters for “shirigomi” (尻込み) literally mean “tight ass” or “closed
ass”, and they are often translated into English as “hesitate” or “flinch.” This is one way of
disparaging the timid and fainthearted. Second, the perception that Japanese prosecutors are too
timid about charging cases has led some scholars and reporters to call them “cowards” (okubyō =
臆病; authors’ interviews, 2009-2019). Third, a prominent Japanese defense lawyer (Takashi
Takano) calls prosecutors “weak-willed” (hetare = ヘタレ) because of their excessively cautious
approach to charging cases that could be eligible for lay judge trial (David T. Johnson & Setsuo
Miyazawa, Japanese Court Reform on Trial, in THE LEGAL PROCESS AND THE PROMISE OF
JUSTICE: STUDIES INSPIRED BY THE WORK OF MALCOLM FEELEY, Rosann Greenspan, Hadar
Aviram, and Jonathan Simon eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2019) pp. 122-138). In Takano’s
view, an excess of prosecutorial prudence undermines the point of the lay judge trial, which is to
give citizens a significant say in making criminal justice decisions. As defined in the Urban
Dictionary, “hetare” is anime slang signifying “an inept and mentally unstable character” who
frequently worries about “something benign.” English synonyms include “baby balls” and
“nebbish.”
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ga miokurareta jiken). The numbers are striking.63 In 2006, Japanese prosecutors
charged 57.0 percent of all homicide cases that were sent to their office. By
2009 the figure had fallen to 48.6 percent, and by 2017 it had dropped to 28.2
percent. The drop in the charge rate (kisoritsu) for arson of a dwelling is
similarly sharp. The “charge rate” for robbery with injury fell from 79.9
percent in 2006 to 32.8 percent in 2013—a decline of nearly three-fifths. As
for sex offenses, the charge rate for rape leading to injury or death dropped
from 69.7 percent in 2006 to 43.7 percent in 2017.64 A similar increase in
prosecutorial caution is evident in the percentage of cases that prosecutors
charge “as is” (sōken zaimei kisoritsu): that is, the percentage of cases that
prosecutors charge with the same crime that was alleged in the paperwork
received from the police. For homicide (including attempts), the “as-is”
charge rate fell from 40.6 percent in 2006, to 32.9 percent in 2009, to 21.3
percent in 2017. The “as-is” charge rate for homicide in 2017 was only about
half what it was 11 years earlier.

63. Takeda, 2019a.
64. As for sex offenses that are not eligible for lay judge trial, the charge-rate (kisoritsu) drop
for rape (gōkan) fell from about 60 percent in 2005 to 34.7 percent in 2014, while the charge rate
for forcible obscenity (kyōsei waisetsu) fell from over 50 percent to 40.7 percent over the same
period of time. In 2018-2019, the Japanese media harshly criticized Japanese courts for acquitting
some criminal defendants who had been charged with sex crimes, but as these statistics suggest,
the main problems with the handling of sex crime cases in Japanese criminal justice is excessive
prosecutorial caution and an “epidemic of disbelief” among Japanese police and prosecutors
regarding the statements made by victims (Mikio Kawai, Seihanzai Muzai Hanketsu, Hontō no
Mondaiten wa Nani ka, ASAHI RONZA, May 15, 2019). In these respects Japan resembles the
United States (Barbara Bradley Hagerty, An Epidemic of Disbelief, THE ATLANTIC, August 2019,
at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/08/an-epidemic-of-disbelief/592807/?).
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TABLE 2 Japan’s Declining Charge Rate, 2000 – 2016
YEAR

DECISION-TOCHARGE (1)

DECISIONNOT-TOCHARGE (2)

CHARGERATE (1/2)

2000

86,897

63,962

57.6

2001

93,286

70,780

56.9

2002

100,913

81,376

55.4

2003

105,375

92,494

53.3

2004

110,193

110,346

50.0

2005

109,441

124,184

46.8

2006

110,298

142,852

43.6

2007

102,993

133,196

43.6

2008

98,570

123,457

44.4

2009

96,541

123,184

43.9

2010

91,322

123,591

42.5

2011

85,586

118,802

41.9

2012

83,823

122,269

40.7

2013

78,774

123,672

38.9

2014

77,405

123,887

38.5

2015

77,268

120,522

39.1

2016

73,060

118,115

38.2

Note: Figures are calculated from annual 犯罪⽩書 [White Paper on Crime],
retrieved at http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/65/nfm/n65_2_2_2_3_0.html#h2-2-302, figure 2-2-3-02-2.
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Japan’s executive prosecutors claim that because charge rates started
declining before lay judge trials started in 2009, the lay judge system cannot
be its cause. We disagree. Prosecutors are charging cases in the shadow of
lay judge trials, and they have been doing so since before 2009. “Mock lay
judge trials” (mogi saiban’in saiban) started soon after the Lay Judge Law
was enacted in 2004, and prosecutors soon realized that lay judge panels
were less likely to give them what they want than were the panels of
professional judges that they were accustomed to. Prosecutors adjusted their
charging standards accordingly, by becoming more cautious. They were
adapting in order to conform to a norm that has long governed their behavior:
“a case should not be charged if the court might wonder about its judgment”
(saibansho ga handan ni mayou jiken wa kiso shinai).
To some observers, the most fundamental change in Japanese criminal
justice is the “mindset” of professional judges, and the main reason for this
change is the presence of lay judges.65 But if there have been changes in
judicial sensibilities, they are being at least partly offset by changes in
prosecutor practice. Most notably, prosecutors have become significantly
more cautious about what crimes to charge—and therefore about what kinds
of cases lay judge panels will adjudicate. As we will explain below,
prosecutors have also become more cautious about what sentences to seek.
Some critics contend that by becoming more cautious, prosecutors are
limiting the role lay judges can play and thereby undermining a reform
that was meant to give citizens more influence in the criminal process. 66
Prosecutors are also doing what legal professionals have done several times
in the past when Japan tried to introduce lay participation into its legal
system: they are minimizing the role lay people can play in determining case
outcomes.67 In these respects, prosecutors are trying to maintain control over
case outcomes by minimizing the influence of amateurs and outsiders. If
this pronounced prosecutorial prudence continues for another decade or two
(and if crime in Japan continues to decline), the lay judge system could
become starved for cases, much as the prewar jury system was.68
Yet the prosecution issues are complicated, because more cautious
charging policies also tends to mean less use of the criminal sanction. For
progressives who believe the criminal sanction has limited capacity to do
good and great capacity to do harm, the timidity of “tight-assed” prosecutors
65. Shinomiya, 2019.
66. Takano, 2019; Takeda, 2019a.
67. Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay participation in the Japanese justice system: A
few preliminary thoughts regarding the lay assessor system (saiban-in seido) from domestic
historical and international psychological perspectives, VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 37 (2004) 935;
Vanoverbeke, 2015.
68. Vanoverbeke, 2015.
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could be a welcome development. At the same time, an abundance of
prosecutorial caution may be denying the new trial system the cases it needs
to show that trials can be more than empty rituals which “ratify” what law
enforcement wants.69 Whatever one thinks about these normative issues, one
conclusion seems clear: For better and for worse, prosecutors continue to
control case inputs in Japanese criminal justice. In this way, they largely
determine what case outputs will be.
4. Conviction Rates
Another manifestation of prosecutorial caution and criminal justice
continuity can be seen in Japan’s conviction rates, which have remained high
in the lay judge era, largely because (as explained above) prosecutors have
become more cautious about what cases to charge for lay judge
adjudication.70 In the three years before lay judge trials started (2006-2008),
the conviction rate in criminal cases that (if they had occurred at a later date)
would have been eligible for lay judge trial was 99.4 percent. Thus, before
the 2009 reform, 1 criminal trial in 167 ended in acquittal. In the first 10
years after the reform (May 2009 through December 2018), the lay judge
conviction rate was 99.1 percent, which means that approximately 1 criminal
trial in 111 has ended in acquittal in the lay judge era.71
Some believe this is a significant decline, 72 and their claim deserves
consideration. As the lay judge system matures, the conviction rate could be
slowly eroding—we would need several more years of data in order to be
sure.73 In the three most recent years for which evidence is available (2016-

69. R. Hirano, Diagnosis of the current code of criminal procedure, LAW IN JAPAN, 22 (1989)
129; Takano, 2019.
70. Takeda, 2019b.
71. Takeda, 2019b.
72. Takeda, 2019b.
73. If the conviction rate is declining, one contributing cause is defense attorneys, who have
become more aggressive and adept at doing criminal defense (Johnson, 2011; Takano, 2019;
Takayama, 2019). According to prosecutor Kikuchi Hiroshi, two leading indicators of
improvement in Japanese defense lawyering are an increase in the number of cases in which
defendants deny the charges against them (hinin jiken), and an increase in the frequency with which
suspects and defendants exercise their right to silence (mokuhiken). H. Kikuchi, Saiban’in saiban
seido shikkō 10 nen o furikaette: kensatsu no tachiba kara (tokushū saiban’in saiban seido shikkō
10 nen no keiki ni kangaeru) [Reflecting on the Lay Judge Trial System in Effect for One Decade],
in KEISATSU RONSHŪ, 72.6 (2019), pp. 29-53. As a prominent defense lawyer put it, “In this era
of recording interrogations (kashika jidai), it has become easier to carry through the right to silence.
Hence, when we defense attorneys consider the most appropriate strategy for our clients, we first
and foremost consider the right to silence. The result is that we advise suspects and defendants to
exercise their right to silence more frequently” (defense lawyer Gotō Sadato quoted in: Y. Gōda,
Saiban’in saiban seido shikkō 10 nen toiu sujime ni omou koto [What to Think a the Milestone of a
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2018), the lay judge conviction rate was 98.4 percent,74 compared to 99.4
percent for 2006-2008. In this interval, 1 defendant in 63 was acquitted, and
acquittals were 2.7 times more likely than they were in the three years
preceding the advent of lay judge trials.
The recent decline in propensity to convict has been hailed as evidence
that lay judge panels are “thoroughly implementing” a principle that has long
been respected in the breach by Japan’s criminal courts: that “defendants
should receive the benefit of the doubt” when there is reasonable doubt about
the evidence.75 But in our view, there is more continuity than change with
respect to conviction rates. First, when 98 or 99 defendants in 100 are being
convicted at trial, it seems fair to say that the conviction rate remains
“extremely high”—as it has been for decades in Japan.76 Second, when lay
judge trials constitute less than 2 percent of all criminal trials in Japan (“a
sliver of cases”), a small decline in the lay judge conviction rate has no
discernable effect on the overall conviction rate. Third, 40 percent (39/99)
of all the acquittals that occurred in the first ten years of Japan’s new trial
system were issued for one kind of crime—trafficking in methamphetamines
—even though these cases constituted only 7.9 percent of all lay judge trials
during that decade. Acquittals for methamphetamine trafficking are five
times more common than the meth caseload would predict (40/7.9 = 5). If
Japanese prosecutors become more careful about charging meth cases (and
we expect they will), this crime-specific acquittal rate will fall in the future.
Finally, in the first 10 years of the lay judge system, there were 99 acquittals:
about 10 per year, on the average. Ten of the 99 (10 percent) were overturned
by High Courts after prosecutors appealed.77 Prosecutors are appealing lay
Decade that the Saiban’in Trial System in in Effect], in KEISATSUGAKU RONSHŪ, 72.6 (2019), pp.
1-27 and 35.
74. Takeda, 2019b.
75. Takeda, 2019b.
76. Johnson, 2002, p. 215. For example, Germany’s conviction rate in 2013 was 85 percent,
and in most recent years it has ranged between 85 percent and 90 percent. See J. M. JEHLE,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN GERMANY: FACTS AND FIGURES (Forum Verlag Godesberg GmbH, 2015).
Among defendants charged with a felony in American state courts, 68 percent were convicted (59
percent of a felony and the remainder of a misdemeanor), with felony conviction rates higher for
defendants originally charged with motor vehicle theft (74 percent), driving-related offenses (73
percent), murder (70 percent), burglary (69 percent), and drug trafficking (67 percent); conviction
rates were lower for defendants originally charged with assault (45 percent). See U.S. Bureau of
Statistics Office of Justice Programs, at https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=403 (retrieved
August 23, 2019). In India, the world’s largest democracy, the conviction rate in the megalopolis
of Mumbai ranged from 18 percent to 25 percent before falling to “an all-time low of 4 percent in
2000.” See S. MEHTA, MAXIMUM CITY: BOMBAY LOST AND FOUND (Vintage, 2004), 175.
77. In addition to the 10 lay judge acquittals that Japan’s High Courts overturned from 2009
to 2018, they also changed 17 “guilty” verdicts (out of 11,429) to “not guilty” (Takeda, 2019b). Of
course, not all acquittals and convictions are appealed, but the contrast is still striking: 1 acquittal
in 10 is overturned on appeal, compared with 1 conviction in 667. The fact that Japanese appellate
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judge acquittals less aggressively than they did in the pre-reform period,
partly out of respect for the principle that legal professionals should defer to
the decisions made by lay participants, as articulated by the Tokyo High
Court in 2013 and by Japan’s Supreme Court in 2014.78 Nonetheless, a 10
percent reversal rate for acquittals on appeal is significant in a system in
which the 60 courts (50 District Courts and 10 branch courts) that hold lay
judge trials produce less than a dozen acquittals per year. 79 When a
substantial proportion of these 60 courts have not issued a single acquittal in
the first decade of the new trial system, the slight uptick in the number of
not-guilty verdicts does not seem very significant.
5. PRCs and Mandatory Prosecution
In 2009, a reform of Japan’s Prosecution Review Commission Law of
1948 enabled panels of 11 citizens on the country’s 201 Prosecution Review
Commissions (PRCs) to institute “mandatory prosecution” (kyōsei kiso) in
some cases. On paper, this reform appears to address the problem of
excessive charging caution summarized in the preceding paragraphs, for it
provides a way for lay people to override the non-charge decisions of
professional prosecutors. Some scholars expected this reform to have large
effects. One predicted that “the new binding power bestowed upon the PRC
can exert a significant authority over, and insert public sentiments and
equitable judgments into, prosecutorial decisions on politically sensitive
cases or controversial issues that may affect the broader public interest. In
addition, the PRC can help expose the fortified terrain of special protection
and immunity given by the Japanese government to influential political
heavyweights, high-ranking bureaucrats, and business elites.” 80 On this
view, PRCs have “become an important channel through which ordinary
people’s moral sentiments—their sense of justice, fairness, and
accountability—can be expressed, articulated, and reflected in the

courts find so much more error in not-guilty verdicts than in convictions is further testament to their
essentially “conservative” nature (Foote, 2010, p. 8). The 66 to 1 disparity also reflects the
tendency of District Courts to convict in the first place, for (with few exceptions) it is trial losers
who file appeals—and Japanese prosecutors seldom lose.
78. Takeda, 2019b.
79. Takeda, 2019b.
80. Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan’s Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems as Deliberative Agents of
Social Change: De-Colonial Strategies and Deliberative Participatory Democracy, CHI.-KENT L.
REV., 102.70 (2011), 4; see also, C. F. Goodman, Prosecution Review Commissions, the Public
Interest, and the Rights of the Accused: The Need for a ‘Grown Up’ in the Room, PACIFIC RIM LAW
& POLICY JOURNAL, 22.1 (2013), 1-48; and H. Fukurai & Z. Wang, Proposal to Establish the
Federal Civil Grand Jury System in America: Effective Civic Oversight of Federal Agencies and
Government Personnel, JOURNAL OF CIVIL & LEGAL SCIENCES, 3 (2014) 1-6.
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deliberation of criminal cases.”81
In reality, Japan’s reformed PRCs are almost “all hat and no cattle,”82
for they have had little effect on prosecutorial practice, as empirical
research shows.83 The two most fundamental research findings are that few
complaints about nonprosecution are brought to PRCs in the first place, and
few of the complaints that are brought result in recommendations to
prosecute or mandatory prosecution. 84 Hence, the net effect of the PRC
reform is little impact on the policies or practices of Japanese prosecutors.
What is more, the rarity of PRC challenges to prosecutors’ non-charge
decisions (only 9 cases of mandatory prosecution in the first 10 years) and
the low rate of conviction after mandatory prosecution (just 2 of the first 13
defendants were convicted, for a conviction rate of 15 percent) may vindicate
the view of professional prosecutors that their non-charge decisions are
appropriate and that most cases of mandatory prosecution were wrong to
override their professional judgment.
Japan’s reformed PRCs could also be described as “all bark and no bite,”
except that even after the 2009 reform there has been little “bark.” Consider
two examples: one involving crimes of the powerful, which were supposed
to be a main focus of PRC review,85 and the other involving a rape case that
received little media coverage in Japan.86

81. Fukurai, 2011, p. 42.
82. This Texas expression refers to big talk without action, power, or substance (see
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/all_hat_and_no_cattle).
83. David T. Johnson & Mari Hirayama, Japan’s Reformed Prosecution Review Commission:
Changes, Challenges, and Lessons, ASIAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY, 14.2 (June 2019), 77-102.
84. Empirical research on Japan’s reformed PRCs has reached at least nine findings: (1) Few
cases are reviewed by the reformed PRCs. (2) There has been no post-reform increase in the number
of cases reviewed by the reformed PRCs. (3) There have been few PRC recommendations to charge
cases that prosecutors originally decided not to charge. (4) Most cases reviewed by PRCs are
relatively low salience. (5) Some of prosecutors’ non-charge categories (such as “no suspicion” and
“no crime”) seem protected from PRC review, which may create a perverse incentive for
prosecutors to put some non-charge cases in these protected categories. (6) Reformed PRCs have
issued few policy recommendations to executive prosecutors (kenjisei). (7) There are few PRCinspired trials, and when such trials do occur, the outcomes for defendants tend to be lenient. (8) In
PRC-inspired trials, there have been more acquittals after the 2009 reform than before it, which
suggests that occasionally prosecutors do charge more aggressively when facing the prospect of
mandatory prosecution. (9) In the first 9 cases of mandatory prosecution, involving a total of 13
defendants, only 2 defendants were convicted, and both received light punishment: a fine of 9000
yen ($90) for one, and a one-year prison term suspended for three years for the other. For more on
the effects of Japan’s PRC reform, see Johnson & Hirayama, 2019, pp. 77-102.
85. Kawai Mikio, Kiso Sōto o Daseru koto ga Keiji Shihō Kaikaku no Pointo, ASAHI RONZA,
Aug. 11, 2015.
86. David McNeill, Justice Postponed: Itoh Shiori and Rape in Japan, ASIA-PACIFIC
JOURNAL, Volume 16, Issue 15, Number 1 (Aug. 1, 2018), pp. 1-6, at https://apjjf.org/2018/15/
McNeill.html.

6 - Johnson

460

7/29/2020 10:19 AM

Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment

[Vol. 1:3

In March 2019, a PRC in Osaka ruled that “non-prosecution is
inappropriate” (fukiso futō) after the Special Investigation Division
(tokusōbu) of the Osaka District Prosecutors Office decided not to charge 38
people (including former Ministry of Finance senior bureaucrat Nobuhisa
Sagawa) in the Moritomo Gakuen cronyism scandal that implicated the wife
and the administration of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe. Many observers
criticized the Osaka PRC for not ruling that “prosecution is appropriate”
(kiso sōto), which would have put considerably more pressure on prosecutors
to charge than its decision that “non-prosecution is inappropriate,” and which
also would have maintained the possibility of mandatory prosecution if
prosecutors decided not to charge for a second time. In August 2019,
prosecutors in Osaka did just that, resulting in the non-prosecution of 10
people who had supposedly been “reinvestigated.”87 In this case as in many
other corruption cases in postwar Japan, prosecutors “let the wicked
sleep”88—and PRCs did little to hold them accountable. Indeed, when an
Osaka NGO (the Citizens Committee to Raise Voices for a Healthy State
Ruled by Law, Kenzen na Hōchi Kokka no tame ni Koe o Ageru Shimin no
Kai) asked an Osaka PRC to disclose documents that their PRC counterparts
in Tokyo had disclosed in previous cases, the Osaka PRC refused to disclose
many documents and blacked out almost all of the words on the documents
that they did disclose. The NGO also noted how strange it was for all of the
case work in the big Moritomo case to be performed by just one of the four
PRCs in Osaka. In these ways, the non-prosecutions in the Moritomo case
raise serious questions about the independence and integrity of Japanese
prosecutors and of the reformed PRCs.89 We need more research on this
subject.
There was also a puzzling degree of PRC passivity in the rape case
involving a freelance journalist named Shiori Itō and Noriyuki Yamaguchi,
a prominent TV journalist and the biographer and friend of Prime Minister
Shinzō Abe. Despite considerable evidence that Yamaguchi had raped Itō
in May 2015 (perhaps after giving her a “date rape drug”), including hotel
87. Osaka Prosecutors Close Moritomo Gakuen Case after Reconfirming No Bureaucrats
Will Be Indicted over Scandal, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 10, 2019), at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2019/08/10/national/crime-legal/osaka-prosecutors-close-moritomo-gakuen-case-reconfirmin
g-no- bureaucrats-will-indicted-scandal/#.Xbf-yi2ZM_U.
88. David T. Johnson, Why the Wicked Sleep: The Prosecution of Political Corruption in
Postwar Japan, ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Volume 24, No. 4 (2000), pp. 59-77.
89. See N. Kataoka, Moritomo Jiken meguri Shimin Dantai ga Kaiken: ‘Osaka Kensatsu
Shinsakai no Fukaiji wa Ijō’ [Citizen Group’s Press Conference about the Moritomo Incident: The
Osaka Prosecutor Review Commission’s Decision not to Disclose is Not Normal] (Shūkan Kinyō
Onrain, YAHOO, Aug. 20, 2019), at https://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/article?a=20190820-00010000kinyobi-soci; and N. Yagi, Sōzō no Nanamejō o Kite Kureta Ōsaka Kensatsu Shinsakai no Kaiji
[The decision by the Osaka Prosecutor Review Commission is above and beyond imagination]
(BLOGOS, July 17, 2019), https://blogos.com/article/391856/.
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surveillance video of a stumbling Itō, the testimony of a taxi driver who had
driven Itō and Yamaguchi to the hotel, and Itō’s repeated statements about
inexplicably falling unconscious and waking up with Yamaguchi on top of
and inside her, a PRC in Tokyo upheld the decision of Tokyo prosecutors
not to prosecute Yamaguchi.90 The criminal case died there, though at the
time of this writing in November 2019, Itō’s civil lawsuit against Yamaguchi
is ongoing.
In our view, the main lesson to learn from the non-prosecutions in the
Moritomo Gakuen and Shiori Itō cases is that Japan’s PRCs remain
as passive and pusillanimous after the 2009 reform 91 as before it. 92 The
acquittal of three TEPCO executives on September 19, 2019, will do nothing
to make this watchdog more likely to bark or bite.93 Indeed, the results of
their mandatory prosecution for “professional negligence resulting in death
and injury” as a result of the Fukushima nuclear meltdown in March 2011
may increase calls to restrict the powers of Japan’s reformed PRCs.94 Some
analysts even argue that government officials or legal professionals should
be given authority to train and supervise PRCs, in order to prevent
“inappropriate” acts of mandatory prosecution that damage the public
interest or “game” the criminal process for political advantage. 95 In our
view, this reform—as one analyst advocates, putting a “grown up” in the
PRC room—could reproduce the problem that has long plagued efforts to
implement lay participation in Japanese criminal justice. Several times in
the past century, Japan’s government officials and legal professionals have
“coopted” the citizens who are asked to serve and thereby “marginalized”
their influence.96

90. Itoh Shiori, 2017, pp. 187-215. For a documentary about Itoh’s case, see “Japan’s Secret
Shame” (BBC Two, 60 minutes, 2018), at https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0b8cfcj.
91. Johnson & Hirayama, 2019.
92. Mark D. West, Prosecution review commissions: Japan's answer to the problem of
prosecutorial discretion, COLUM. L. REV., 92 (1992), 684.
93. S. Abe, Former TEPCO Execs Cleared Over Role in 2011 Nuclear Accident, ASAHI
SHIMBUN ASIA & JAPAN WATCH, Sept. 19, 2019.
94. For critiques of the reformed PRCs, see these three newspaper articles: Kyōsei Kiso o
Kangaeru: Konnan na Risshō Muzai Aitsugu [Thinking about Mandatory Prosecution: Continuous
acquittals because of difficulties to prove], SANKEI SHIMBUN, May 18, 2019, p. 31; Kyōsei Kiso o
Kangaeru: Yūzai Tamerau Saibankan [Thinking about Mandatory Prosecution: Judges are
hesitant to convict], SANKEI SHIMBUN, May 21, 2019, p. 22; and Kyōsei Kiso Seido 10 nen Hikari
to Kage: Umoreta Jijitsu, Hanmei Keiki [Light and Shadow of one Decade of Mandatory
Prosecution: Hidden Evidence, An Opportunity to Clarify], TOKYO SHIMBUN, May 21, 2019, p. 3.
95. Goodman, 2013.
96. Anderson & Nolan, 2004.
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6. Criminal Sentencing
We have argued that despite the lay judge and Prosecution Review
Commission reforms, there is much substantive continuity in Japanese
prosecution. Now we will show that there is striking continuity in criminal
sentencing as well.
After Japan’s lay judge and victim participation reforms, sentence
severity increased for some offenses, including rape, sexual molestation, and
assault with injury. The increased severity for sex offenders has received
considerable attention,97 but the heightened harshness must be called modest.
The average sentencing increases can be measured in months, not in the large
leaps of severity that American sentencing reforms have often generated.98
For other crimes such as homicide, robbery, arson, and trafficking
methamphetamines, Japan’s pre-reform and post-reform sentencing patterns
are so similar that when sentencing averages are plotted over time on the
same graph, they look almost indistinguishable.99 In lay judge trials, there
has been a small increase in the use of suspended sentences (shikkō yūyo)
with supervision, apparently because lay judges are more likely than
professional judges to believe in the possibility of rehabilitation through state
supervision. On the whole, however, there was much more continuity in
criminal sentencing than change during the first decade of Japan’s lay
participation reforms.100
This sentencing continuity is hardly accidental. Its key proximate cause
is the same conservatism of Japanese legal professionals that we saw in our
discussion of charging practices, except here it is the conservatism of judges,
not prosecutors. After the lay judge reform took effect in 2009, there was a
noticeable surge in sentencing harshness for some crimes, as can be seen in
the frequency of cases in which the actual sentence imposed by a lay judge
panel (ryōkei) exceeded the sentence requested by prosecutors (kyūkei).
From 2010 to 2013, there were 48 of these “extra harsh” sentences—an
average of 12 per year. But from 2014 to 2017, the number of “extra harsh”
sentences plummeted to 9 (about 2 per year), a decline of 81 percent. This
decline occurred because Japan’s judicial bureaucracy intervened, by taming
the tendency of ordinary citizens to sock-it-to-some-defendants at sentencing.
The judicial bureaucracy employed several mechanisms to reign in the
wayward sentencing impulses of lay judges. Appellate court decisions
reduced many of the “extra harsh” sentences and thereby sent messages to
97.
98.

Hirayama, 2012.
FUJITA MASAHIRO, JAPANESE SOCIETY AND LAY PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
SOCIAL ATTITUDES, TRUST, AND MASS MEDIA (Springer, 2018), pp. 51-64.
99. Johnson & Miyazawa, 2019, p. 130.
100. Takeda, 2019c.
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future lay judge panels about what will and will not be tolerated. The
judiciary sent memos and organized training courses for front-line judges, to
stress the importance of sentencing consistency and continuity. Most
fundamentally, Japan’s professional judiciary lobbied to establish a lay judge
trial policy of relying on sentencing norms based on pre-reform practices,
through a computerized data base known as the “sentence search system”
(ryōkei kensaku shisutemu), which can be viewed by prosecutors and defense
lawyers too.101 The main effect of these judicial interventions was to control
the deviant sentencing desires of ordinary citizens by making them conform
to judicial expectations.102 And the main arena where this conformity is
accomplished is the deliberation room (hyōgishitsu), where judges and lay
judges discuss verdicts and sentences, 103 and where judges possess more
information about cases because they participated in a pretrial process
(kōhan mae seiri tetsuzuki) where evidence is discussed expansively and
where the trial schedule is decided. Social psychological experiments show
that when lay judges do not participate in the pretrial process, their unequal
access to case information handicaps them in deliberations with judges.104
In post-trial surveys and press conferences, the large majority of lay
judges say they felt able to speak their mind during deliberations, but there
are enough statements from lay judges who complain about professional
judges who talked too much, or who steered the panel toward a “preexisting
conclusion” (ketsuron ariki), or who made lay participants feel more like
“decorations” (kazarimono) than adjudicators, that it appears one common
pre-reform prediction is being realized: in the deliberations of a mixed panel
of professional judges and ordinary citizens, the former tend to dominate the
latter.105 Former lay judges often use the words “facilitator” (matomeyaku)
to describe the role judges play in deliberations. They also say that judges
brought lay-judges “back on track” (kidō shūsei) after the amateurs went
“off-track” (dassen).106 Mock trial experiments arrive at similar conclusions,
for lay judges tend to “obey the previous sentencing trends, rather than
adhering to their original opinions by resisting the pressure from the graph
101. Judge Gōda Yoshimitsu (2019, pp. 24-25) has defended this conservative “framework for
sentencing” (handan wakugumi) as follows: “You often hear the opinion ‘wouldn’t it be better to
arrive at a more objective conclusion in deliberations by having lay judges state their opinions more
autonomously, free from the framework for sentencing established by professional judges that is
often imposed on lay judges?’… Actually, the framework for sentencing we use is the result of an
accumulation of countless cases in the era when professional judges made sentencing decisions on
their own. If this method and the practical rules of thumb from that time are considered worthless,
then I think this would amount to nothing other than throwing away a clearly rational framework.”
102. Takeda, 2019c.
103. Takeda, 2019c.
104. Fujita, 2018, pp. 131-171.
105. Vanoverbeke, 2015; Shinomiya, 2019.
106. Vanoverbeke, 2015, ch.6.
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[of sentencing precedents] and professional judges.” 107 When there are
differences of opinion between judges and lay judges, a “professional rule of
thumb” (shokugyōteki keikensoku) tends to prevail over the “common sense”
(jōshiki) of citizens.108 In short, judges routinely play the role of parent and
teacher, with lay judges as their children and pupils.109 They behave like
“overprotective parents” who monitor and control the behavior of their
children by saying “You should not see this!” and “You should not touch
that!”110 As a defense lawyer sardonically summarizes,
Japanese judges will, based on their vast knowledge and
vision, politely explain everything to lay judges in a way the latter
can easily understand. And lay judges will accept this, by
participating in the trial knowing that, no matter what, the ‘kind’
judges will explain whatever they do not understand.111
The extent to which judges orchestrate lay judge deliberations can also
be seen in how they schedule trials. Their aim is to keep lay judge trials as
“compact” (konpakuto) as possible. To achieve this end, judges admit a
limited amount of evidence for the lay judge panels to consider, and they
schedule every trial session down to the minute, including the timing of each
break (kyūkei) and the day and hour the verdict will be pronounced. This
judicial orchestration reached an extreme on July 15, 2010, when the chief
judge of Tottori District Court waived a stopwatch at a defense lawyer to
warn him to stay within his allotted speaking time. Soon afterwards the
Tottori Bar Association protested by releasing a “Presidential Statement on
Showing a Stopwatch in Court” (July 23, 2010). But judges remain
determined to script lay judge trials so as to keep the judicial train running
on time.112 Even potentially capital trials are scripted to maximize efficiency
and minimize the “burdens” (futan) imposed on lay judges.113 The contrast
with American-style “super due process” is striking.114
We do not welcome “professional rules of thumb” and “judicial

107. Masahiko Saeki & Eiichiro Watamura, The Impact of Previous Sentencing Trends on Lay
Judges’ Sentencing Decisions, in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN, Jianhong Liu
and Setsuo Miyazawa eds., (Springer, 2018), p. 288.
108. Shinomiya, 2019, p. 10.
109. Takayama, 2019.
110. Takano, 2019, p. 24.
111. Takano, 2019, p. 25.
112. Takano, 2019.
113. David T. Johnson, Capital punishment without capital trials in Japan’s lay judge system,
ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL, 8.52 (2010), pp. 1-38.
114. DAVID T. JOHNSON, AMERIKAJIN NO MITA NIHON NO SHIKEI (Iwanami Sinsho, 2019),
pp. 25-52.
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orchestration” that schedules the hour a verdict will be announced before the
trial has even started. Yet as we saw with the cautious charging policies of
Japanese prosecutors, there is normative complexity here, too. On the one
hand, the commitment of Japan’s judiciary to continuity in sentencing serves
the value of “consistency” in Japanese criminal justice.115 This conservatism
can be criticized, for what is the point of empowering citizens to decide
criminal sentences if their preferences must conform to those of professional
judges? On the other hand, when deviations from preexisting sentencing
norms occur in lay judge trials, appellate courts usually revise them in a
downward direction—towards leniency, not severity.116 In this way, judicial
conservatism tends to serve the interests of criminal defendants, much as
prosecutorial conservatism does with respect to criminal charging. We end
our analysis of this limit of lay participation with a question that admits no
easy answer: should judicial control of sentencing outcomes, the
marginalization of lay judge voices, and continuity in sentencing substance
be welcomed by progressives who believe criminal sanctions have immense
capacity to harm people and little potential for helping them?
7. Death Sentencing
In the decade before lay judge trials started, the number of death
sentences in Japan surged. The country had 10 or more death sentences per
year from 2000 to 2007, and in the 2000s (2000-2009) a total of 123 death
sentences were imposed by Japanese district courts—an average of 12.3
death sentences per year. In the nine years since then (2010-2018), lay judge
tribunals have imposed only 36 death sentences, which is an average of 4
death sentences per year. From the 2000s to the 2010s, the number of death
sentences declined by two-thirds. See Table 3.

115.
116.

David T. Johnson, 2002, pp. 147-178.
Takeda, 2019c.
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TABLE 3 Japan’s Death Sentencing Rate before & after the Lay Judge
Reform of 2009, by Number of Victims Killed

Years
Percentage

# of Victims

# of DS Requested

# of DS Imposed

DS

1980-2009

1

100

32

32%

1980-2009

2

164

96

59%

1980-2009

3 or more

82

65

79%

1980-2009

All

346

193

56%

2010-2018

1

8

4

50%

2010-2018

2

32

19

59%

2010-2018

3 or more

13

13

100%

2010-2018

All

53

36

68%

Source: Takeda Masahiro, “Higai Hitori de Shikei 4nin: Higaisha Kanjo o Ishiki”, Kyoto Shimbun,
March 23, 2019, p.6.

There are two main reasons for this decline in capital outcomes. First,
Japan’s homicide rate has fallen in recent years (as explained above, so have
Japanese crime rates more generally). As the total number of murders
declined, so did the number of heinous homicides for which prosecutors
could reasonably seek a sentence of death.117 Second, in the shadow of a
new trial system in which outcomes are less predictable and lay judges may
want to deviate from the judiciary’s long established death sentencing norms,
prosecutors became more selective about when to seek a sentence of death.118
From 1980 to 2009, prosecutors sought a death sentence (shikei kyūkei) for
an average of 11.5 homicide defendants per year. From 2010 to 2018, the
117.
118.

D. Johnson, 2019, pp. 111-123.
D. Johnson, 2019, pp. 111-123.
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comparable figure is just 5.6 defendants per year. Prosecutors’ increased
selectivity in seeking a sentence of death is another way in which they have
become more cautious in their decision-making, so as to maintain control
over trial outcomes in the new system.
Before 2009, many analysts expected that the participation of lay judges
would make Japanese courts less likely to impose the ultimate punishment
when prosecutors sought a sentence of death.119 Such predictions echoed the
so-called “Marshall Hypothesis,” which posits that the more you know about
the death penalty (or in Japan’s case, the more lay judges think about it), the
less you (or they) will like it.120 But that has not happened. As Table 3 shows,
from 1980 to 2009, panels of three professional judges imposed a sentence
of death in 56 percent of the cases that prosecutors sought the ultimate
punishment.121 By comparison, in the post-reform period of 2010-2018, lay
judge panels imposed a sentence of death in 68 percent of the cases that
prosecutors sought one. The likelihood of a death sentence being imposed
when prosecutors seek one has risen most notably in cases in which three or
more persons are killed. In the thirty years before the lay judge reform, 79
percent (65/82) of such cases resulted in a sentence of death, compared with
100 percent (13/13) in the nine years from 2010 to 2018.122
These data suggest that changes in Japanese death sentencing have been
small in the lay judge era. Moreover, when lay judge panels have imposed a
sentence of death on a defendant who killed “only” one person, as they did
4 times in the first 9 years of the new trial system, 3 of them were
reduced on appeal to a life sentence. 123 Here again we find evidence of
Japan’s judicial bureaucracy policing the sentencing decisions of lay judges.
But there is also complexity, for the lay judge system has made
prosecutors more cautious about seeking a sentence of death in the first place.
If judges and prosecutors are marginalizing the role lay that participants play
in capital sentencing, they are doing so in ways that often benefit criminal
defendants. The broadest effect of this double dynamic—prosecutors
seeking fewer sentences of death, and judges reigning in the populist

119. Leah Ambler, The People Decide: The Effect of the Introduction of the Quasi-Jury System
(Saibanin Seido) on the Death Penalty in Japan, NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS, Volume 6, Issue 1 (Fall 2008), pp. 1-24, at https://scholarlycommons.law.north
western.edu/njihr/vol6/iss1/1/.
120. Carol S. Steiker, The Marshall Hypothesis Revisited, HOWARD LAW JOURNAL 52 (2008)
525.
121. In the years immediately preceding the lay judge reform, Japan’s death sentencing rate
was 66 percent. That is, District Court panels of three professional judges imposed a sentence of
death about 2 times out of every 3 that prosecutors sought one. See YOMIURI SHIMBUN SHAKAIBU,
SHIKEI (Chūō kōron shinsha, 2013), p. 274.
122. Takeda, 2019c.
123. Takeda, 2019c.
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impulses of lay judges—could be to bolster the legitimacy of Japanese
capital punishment. Indeed, the key consequence of Japan’s lay judge
reform could be that in making the death penalty smaller it has “entrenched
ever deeper what remains” of it.124 We call this a bonsai theory of capital
punishment. Its key claim is that a smaller death penalty may be more
durable if it appeals to the ambivalent sensibilities of a country that has long
resisted the transnational trend toward abolition.125
8. Victim Participation
Victims were long neglected and ignored in the criminal justice systems
of many countries.126 In Japan, too, the criminal justice system “provided
virtually no protection for victims before the turn of the twenty-first
century.”127 In recent years, however, Japan and other countries have moved
victims closer to center stage of the criminal process.128 Critics contend that
a punitive victims’ rights movement has made Japanese criminal justice
worse, by undermining fairness and due process (a procedural claim), and by
making sanctions significantly harsher (a substantive claim). 129 But the
results of victim-centered reform are more complicated than these critiques
claim, and they are also more modest. As shown by Erik Herber in his
insightful account of “victim participation” in Japanese criminal justice, the
available evidence does “not allow for clear conclusions as to how victim
participation impacts sentencing practices—or fact finding practices, for that
matter.”130 In this domain of lay participation, we again find evidence of
substantive continuity.
To increase the role that victims play in Japanese criminal justice, the
124. Hugo Adam Bedau, An Abolitionist’s Survey of the Death Penalty in America Today, in
DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? THE EXPERTS
FROM BOTH SIDES MAKE THEIR CASE, Hugo Adam Bedau and Paul Cassell eds., (Oxford, 2004),
p. 24.
125. David T. Johnson, A Factful Perspective on Capital Punishment, JOURNAL OF HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICE, Volume 11, Issue 2 (July 2019), pp. 334-345; and David T. Johnson & Franklin
E. Zimring, The Death Penalty’s Continued Decline, CURRENT HISTORY, Volume 118, No. 811
(November 2019), pp. 316-321.
126. KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS’ RIGHTS: THE NEW LAW AND POLITICS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (University of Toronto Press, 1999).
127. Shigenori Matsui, Justice for the Accused or Justice for Victims? The Protection of
Victims’ Rights in Japan, ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL, 13, 1 (2011) 55.
128. Matsui, 2011; DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION,
AND A ROAD TO REPAIR (The New Press, 2019).
129. Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Increasing Punitiveness and the Rising Populism in
Japanese Criminal Justice Policy, PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY, Volume 10, No. 1 (January 2008), pp.
47-77; and Maiko Tagusari, Does the Death Penalty Serve Victims?, United Nations Human Rights
Office of the High Commissioner, Death Penalty and the Victims (UN, 2016), pp. 41-48.
130. Herber, 2019, p. 126 (emphasis added).
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country’s Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) has been revised twice: first in
2000, to enable victims (or their legal representatives) to make Victim
Statements of Opinion (VSO) regarding their case; and then again in 2008,
to create a Victim Participation System (VPS) that gives victims various
rights in some serious criminal cases, including the right to attend the trial,
the right to express an opinion to prosecutors about how their authority
should be exercised, the right to question witnesses in court, and the right to
make a statement about the facts of a case and the application of the law.131
Note, though, that the law says victims may do these things: the actual nature
and extent of victim participation depends on the characteristics of a case
and the judges’ exercise of discretion.132
Japan’s VSO and VPS reforms have had an impact on criminal sanctions
in certain cases—typically by making sentences a little harsher, especially
for sex crimes.133 These reforms have also made some criminal cases more
emotional (uetto), especially in homicide trials, where tears often flow, and
where anger and outrage are common. 134 At the same time, victim
participation has made Japanese criminal justice more “therapeutically
oriented,” by fostering practices that are meant to improve the “emotional
and psychological well-being” of crime victims and survivors.135
Considering how badly victims used to be neglected and manipulated in
Japanese criminal justice,136 these changes can be called progress.137 But
efforts to bolster victim participation are also limited and troubling in several
respects. For starters, some new practices seem to be “traumatizing”
victims.138 More fundamentally, most victims of crime never report it to the
police, 139 and when victimization reports do get made, the police do not
131. MASAHIKO SAEKI, HANZAI HIGAISHA NO SHIHŌ SANKA TO RYŌKEI (Tōkyō Daigaku
Shuppankai, 2016).
132. Herber, 2019, p. 106. According to the Japanese Ministry of Justice White Paper on
Crime for 2017, “about 30 percent of the trials in which victims participate are lay judge trials”
(Herber, 2019, p. 122). Since lay judge trials constitute only about 2 percent of all criminal trials
in Japan, victim participation is approximately 15 times more likely to occur in lay judge trials than
in trials before a single professional judge or a panel of three professional judges. Because of the
scholarly and journalistic neglect of non-lay judge criminal trials in Japan (discussed above in limit
1, “A sliver of cases”), we know much more about victim participation in lay judge trials than we
do in criminal trials presided over only by professional judges.
133. MASAHIKO SAEKI, HANZAI HIGAISHA NO SHIHŌ SANKA TO RYŌKEI (Tōkyō Daigaku
Shuppankai, 2016).
134. David T. Johnson, Capital punishment without capital trials in Japan’s lay judge system,
ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL, 8.52 (2010), pp. 1-38.
135. Herber, 2019, p. 115.
136. D. Johnson, 2002, pp. 201-210.
137. MASAHIKO SAEKI, HANZAI HIGAISHA NO SHIHŌ SANKA TO RYŌKEI (Tōkyō Daigaku
Shuppankai, 2016); Matsui, 2011.
138. Herber, 2019, pp. 115-121.
139. Herber, 2019, p. 106.

6 - Johnson

470

7/29/2020 10:19 AM

Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment

[Vol. 1:3

bother to record some of them.140 Victims of crime are also excluded from
the pretrial processes where trial schedules are decided and case outcomes
are shaped.141 Most importantly, the “vast majority of victims choose not to
participate” in the VPS.142 When victims do participate, their statements
tend to be well-rehearsed and highly scripted, with prosecutors playing the
role of director. Preparatory meetings between victims and prosecutors are
frequent and intense, with “witness tests” (shōnin tesuto) repeated several
times before they are enacted at trial.143
Prosecutors are not the only legal professionals to shape what victims do
at trial. Judges have influence too, especially by deciding which victims can
participate and by monitoring and restricting the content of their statements.
In acts that have been praised by progressives but lamented by police,
prosecutors, and victims (and by some lay judges as well), judges are even
requiring photographic evidence of victims’ injuries (and corpses) to be
softened and blurred (kakō suru) before being shown in court, in order to
reduce the potential for inflammatory and prejudicial effects on lay judges, and
in order to protect lay judges from the “emotional and psychological burden”
(seishin teki futan) of viewing the corporeal consequences of crime.144
In addition, Japan’s new forms of victim participation are substantively
“conservative” in the sense that they reinforce traditional patterns in
Japanese criminal justice. As surveys show, many Japanese defendants and
defense lawyers “feel constrained” by the victims’ presence at trial because
it is difficult to challenge the accuracy of victims’ assertions or the
authenticity of their feelings without seeming to disrespect them.145 Some
defense lawyers even say it is difficult to speak in their client’s defense
because they fear lay judges will think they are “blaming the victim” or that
the defendant is insufficiently remorseful, thereby increasing the risk of
conviction and punishment. In these ways, the victim participation systems
perpetuate two patterns in Japanese criminal justice: the subordination of the
defense to the prosecution, 146 and reliance on the tropes of “repentance,
confession, and absolution,” even when such expressions are insincere.147 In
the end, Japan’s new forms of victim participation “play a role in service of
140. Herber, 2019, p. 106.
141. Herber, 2019, p. 109.
142. Herber, 2019, p. 124.
143. Herber, 2019, p. 111.
144. Takeda, 2019c.
145. Herber, 2019, p. 114.
146. Setsuo Miyazawa, Introduction: An Unbalanced Adversary System: Issues, Policies, and
Practices in Japan, in Context and in Comparative Perspective, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS, Malcolm M. Feeley and Setsuo
Miyazawa, eds., (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 1-11.
147. D. Johnson, 2002, 179-201.
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traditional criminal justice goals,”148 by keeping defense lawyers docile,149
and by pressuring defendants to submit to authority.150
9. No-shows, the Duty of Confidentiality, and the Length of Trials and
Deliberations
Our penultimate point about the limits of lay participation in Japanese
criminal justice focuses on a cluster of three criticisms that are frequently
directed at the lay judge system: (a) the vast majority of Japanese citizens
refuse to serve as lay judges; (b) those who do serve are bound by an
“obligation of confidentiality” (shuhi gimu) that severely limits what aspects
of their trial experience can be disclosed and discussed; and (c) the length of
lay judge trials and deliberations has increased significantly since the new
system started in 2009. In our view, the latter two facts (longer trials and lay
judge confidentiality) are contributing causes of the no-show problem.
The most unflattering fact about Japan’s lay judge system is how few
citizens are willing to serve in it. Of course, many citizens try to avoid jury
duty in the United States too,151 where “the flight from jury service is as old
as the jury system itself,” though it seems to have intensified in recent years
as jury duty lost some of its “aura of honor.”152 In Japan, however, nearly
80 percent of lay judge candidates do not accept the call to serve.153 Threequarters of this 80 percent are people who get “excused” (jitai) for reasons
the judiciary regards as legitimate, such as old age, illness, work or school
commitments, and family responsibilities. The other one-quarter of noshows do not show up in court on the designated day (kesseki). We call the
combined effect of these two types of refusal Japan’s “no show” problem.

148. Herber, 2019, p. 125.
149. D. Johnson, 2002, pp. 71-85.
150. D. Johnson, 2002, pp. 185-192.
151. Mona Chalabi, What Are the Chances of Serving on a Jury?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, June 5,
2015, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-are-the-chances-of-serving-on-a-jury/. As Chalabi
explains, the U.S. National Center for State Courts (NCSC) has estimated that “in a given year, 32
million people get summoned for service—though only 8 million of them actually report for jury
duty (there are lots of reasons for that difference, including the 4 million summonses returned by
the post office marked as undeliverable and the 3 million people who fail to appear). It’s estimated
that only 1.5 million people are eventually selected to serve on a jury in a state court each year
[approximately 1 adult in 150].” These numbers come from a 2007 survey conducted by the NCSC.
152. STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM
(Times Books, 1994), p. 52; ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL (University
of Chicago Press, 2009).
153. When Japan’s lay judge system started in 2009, the no-show rate was already 61 percent.
This rate is higher in rural and regional courts than in urban ones, and it is higher for women than
for men. Surveys also show that people who want to serve as a lay judge are more likely to serve
than people who do not want to serve (Takeda, 2019e).
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See Table 4.154
TABLE 4 Japan’s Lay Judge Selection Process, 2009-2018
YEAR

TOTAL
CANDIDATES
(A)

SUMMONS
SENT
(B)

CANCELLATION
ACCEPTED (C)

IN-COURT
APPEARANCE
(D)a

IN-COURT
APPEARANCE
RATE (%)b

TOTAL
APPEARANCE
RATE (%)C

2009

13,423

9,638

3,185

5,415

83.9

40.3

2010

126,465

94,220

34,147

48,422

80.6

38.3

2011

131,880

94,109

37,756

44,150

78.4

33.5

2012

135,535

97,047

42,443

41,543

76.0

30.6

2013

135,207

95,541

43,451

38,527

74.0

28.5

2014

123,059

86,304

40,351

32,833

71.5

26.7

2015

132,831

92,076

43,806

32,598

67.5

24.5

2016

127,811

88,326

41,563

30,313

64.8

23.7

2017

120,187

84,176

41,707

27,152

63.9

22.6

2018

127,490

87,787

44,907

67.5

22.7

TOTAL

1,173,888

829,224

373,316

75.2

30.4

28,961
329,914

Note: This table is adapted from Supreme Court of Japan, 2019, 裁判員裁判の実施
状況について (制度施⾏~令和元年５⽉末・速報）[Report on the results of the
implementation of lay judge trials (from implementation to the end of May 2019)],
retrieved from http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/vcms_lf/r1_5_saibaninsokuhou.pdf
(see also Vanoverbeke and Fukurai, 2019).
a
These cases were either dropped or transferred to different jurisdictions.
b
The number of candidates summoned to appear in court divided by the number of
in-court appearances.
c
The total number of candidates divided by the number of in-court appearances.
154. In most writing about jury and lay judge “no-shows” in the United States and Japan, the
reluctance and refusal of citizens to serve is assumed to be problematic (Adler, 1994; Takayuki Ii,
Anata mo asu wa saiban’in!? [You will also become a Saiban’in tomorrow!?] (Nihon Hyōronsha,
2019). But we wonder if no-shows might sometimes be a blessing in disguise. As an Oahu resident
Stuart Taba wrote in a letter to the Honolulu Star-Advertiser (August 20, 2019, p. A10), “The
American method of jury selection—conscription, like the old-school military draft—must be
replaced by a method that produces willing jurors. Willing jurors will more likely be effective at
their assignment than would reluctant jury members.” We know of no research that tests this
hypothesis, but if Mr. Taba’s hunch is true, then concerns about Japan’s high “no-show” rate would
be much ado about nothing.
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The high and rising no-show rate has many interacting causes.155 First,
it is easy to escape lay judge duty in Japan, because the judiciary excuses
almost anyone who asks to be excused, and because absentees without
excuse are never fined. This laissez faire approach to lay judge service
creates a moral hazard, by creating incentives not to serve. Second, by law,
the pay for serving as a lay judge is modest (up to 10,000 yen per day), and
many citizens who serve do not get adequately compensated by their
employer for the days of work missed. Some even have to use days of paid
leave or (if that is not permitted) are pressed to take unpaid leave from
work. 156 Third, changing employment patterns in the Japanese economy
have resulted in more people working in part-time or irregular jobs for which
the no-show rate is higher than for people in full-time, regular occupations.
In Japan, absence from work can damage one’s reputation. Fourth,
affordable child care is hard to find in Japan. This helps explain why the noshow rate is higher for women than for men. Fifth, in some cases involving
defendants with connections to organized crime (bōryokudan), lay judges
were approached by gangsters outside the courtroom. News about this kind
of contact may be inhibiting citizens from serving in similar cases.157 Sixth,
as the lay judge system has matured, media coverage has declined, and so
has citizen interest in serving. Some trial events are no longer considered
newsworthy because they are no longer new.158
In addition to the foregoing causes, Japan’s high no show-rate is also
shaped by two forces that are proximate to the new trial system: an
“obligation of confidentiality” (shuhi gimu) for lay judges, and a significant
increase in the length of lay judge trials and deliberations (shinri-hyōgi jikan).
We discuss each in turn.
Under penalty of fine or imprisonment, lay judges and former lay judges
must not disclose to outsiders (people who did not serve on their lay judge
panel) many aspects of their trial and deliberation experiences, including
how judges and lay judges voted, what they think of the trial outcome, and
who said what during deliberations. Many observers believe this rule
imposes large emotional and psychological “burdens” (futan) on lay judges,
who are forever forbidden from discussing “potentially traumatizing”
155.
156.

Takeda, 2019e.
M. TAGUCHI, SAIBAN’IN NO ATAMA NO NAKA: 14 NIN NO HAJIMETE MONOGATARI
[INSIDE THE HEADS OF THE JURORS: THE UNIQUE STORY OF 14 PEOPLE] (Gendaijinbunsha, 2013),
p. 48.
157. Takeda, 2019e.
158. Coverage of the lay judge system by some Japanese media has been largely negative. For
example, in 2001 and 2002, Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan’s Wall Street Journal) published roughly
equal numbers of positive and negative articles about the new trial system, but in the subsequent
decade the number of negative articles exceeded the number of positive articles by more than 3 to
1 (Fujita, 2018, p. 247).
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matters that they heard and saw at trial159—not to mention other matters that
are interesting and important. The obligation of confidentiality also makes
it impossible to share some positive impressions and experiences which
could encourage more citizens to serve as lay judges. In its most subjective
form, concern about confidentiality can be expressed as a simple question:
Why do something that is interesting, important, unusual, and challenging if
you cannot even talk about it?
Although many analysts believe the obligation of confidentiality should
be relaxed or even eliminated,160 the vast majority of citizens who serve as
lay judges say they want to preserve it.161 In one survey by the Supreme
Court’s General Secretariat, “nine times more ex-saiban-ins thought the
confidentiality clause was necessary than those who requested reducing
it.” 162 Similarly, while the obligation of confidentiality contradicts the
principles of transparency and accountability that have motivated many of
Japan’s justice system reforms,163 it is welcomed by professional judges, who
are protected from public scrutiny and criticism by an expansive policy of
secrecy that is kept intentionally vague in order to maximize its
conversation-discouraging effects.
It is sometimes said that Japan’s high no-show rate undermines the
legitimacy of lay judge trials. On this view, the lay judge system might not
be sustainable if many citizens continue refusing to serve.164 The official
position of Japan’s judiciary is that the no-show rate is a concern, but it is
“not high enough to affect the operation of the lay judge system.”165 More
generally, Japan’s judiciary states that “the [lay judge] system has been
159. Mark Levin & Virginia Tice, Japan’s New Citizen Judges: How Secrecy Imperils Judicial
Reform, THE ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL, 19 (2009) 6-09.
160. Ii, 2019.
161. Among the minority of former lay judges who feel burdened by the obligation of
confidentiality, some have likened their own situation to that of the “hidden Christians” (kakure
kirusuchan) who were tortured and killed by the bakufu government in the Tokugawa era (Takeda,
2019e). Apparently the facile conflation of “micro-aggressions” and serious acts of violence is not
confined to the United States (Scott O. Lilienfeld, Microaggressions: Strong Claims, Inadequate
Evidence, PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE, Volume 12, Issue 1 (January 2017), pp.
138-169).
162. Yanase, 2016, p. 345. This is similar to the situation in Belgium, where a penalty could
be imposed on former jurors who do not keep the appropriate secrets (though the sanction has never
been used). In the Belgian context, the penalty is considered a tool to protect jurors from excessive
media attention and from pressure to reveal names and the personal opinions of other jurors (Dimitri
Vanoverbeke, Berugi kara Mita Saibanin Seido, in Ii, 2019, pp. 177-182).
163. Frank K. Upham, Japanese Legal Reform in Institutional, Ideological, and Comparative
Perspective, HASTINGS INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW, 36 (2013) 567.
164. Ii, 2019.
165. JAPAN TIMES, May 16, 2019, at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/05/16/national/
crime-legal/japanese-supreme-court-chief-justice-says-lay-judge-system-well-received-improvem
ents-needed-spur-public-interest/#.XbvDkK97mM8.
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accepted positively by the public,”166 a claim which research supports.167
Claims about “legitimacy” are difficult to prove or disprove.168 But if
lay judge participation rates reach a point of crisis, there is a ready solution:
Japan could (as permitted by law) start convening lay judge trials with a
panel of 1 professional judge and 4 lay judges (instead of 3 and 6,
respectively). This would reduce the number of citizen-participants by onethird. But in the first 10 years of the new system (more than 12,000 lay judge
trials), the more compact tribunal was never used even though guilt was
uncontested in about half of all cases.169 The non-use of small panels is all
the more striking when one considers how much anxiety Japanese journalists
and judges express about the heavy “burdens” (futan) purportedly imposed
on lay judges, and how much energy the judiciary spends trying to streamline
lay judge trials.170
The main reason for avoiding smaller lay judge panels is the judiciary’s
concern that a judge’s capacity to control the course of deliberations would
be significantly curtailed if he or she does not have professional allies on the
bench.171 Research shows that smaller groups deliberate more actively than
larger groups do. Smaller groups also reduce the power of factions—which
the lone judge could easily be (or be a part of) on a smaller panel.172 Since
the risk of a professional judge failing to stay “on top” of the lay judges is
perceived to be higher with a ratio of 1 professional to 4 amateurs instead of
1 to 2, a simple solution to the “no-show” problem is being rejected because
it does not serve the interests of professional judges and because it increases
the risk of damage to their professional reputations. In this respect, Japanese
judges are like their professional counterparts in the police and the procuracy,
for they have been able to limit the scope of criminal justice reform to issues
they consider safe. This “second face of power”173 has long been evident in
the status-quo preserving ways that legal professionals have responded to lay
participation reforms in Japan’s legal system.174
What about the third point in this problematic triangle—the lengthening
of lay judge trials and deliberations? The increased complexity suppresses
166. Lay Judge System Needs Tweaking, Chief Justice Says, JAPAN TIMES, May 17, 2019, p. 2.
167. Fujita, 2018, p. 275.
168. C. VAN HAM, J. THOMASSEN, K. AARTS & R. ANDEWEG, EDS., MYTH AND REALITY OF
THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS: EXPLAINING TRENDS AND CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN
ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES (Oxford University Press, 2017).
169. Van Ham, J. Thomassen, K. Aarts & R. Andeweg, 2017.
170. Takayama, 2019.
171. Takano, 2019.
172. As Kage (2017, p. 115) summarizes in her discussion of system design, “A smaller
number of lay judges, then, might actually enhance the power of lay judges vis-à-vis professional
judges” (emphasis in original).
173. Bachrach & Baratz.
174. Anderson & Nolan, 2004.
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the lay judge service rate by imposing a larger burden on the citizens who
serve. In economic terms, longer trials and deliberations raise the “price” of
participation. In 2009, the average lay judge trial took 3.7 days, and the
average lay judge deliberation was 6.6 hours. As Table 5 shows, by 2018,
the comparable durations were 10.8 days and 12.9 hours—a near tripling and
a near doubling, respectively.175 Over the same period of time, there was a
marked decline in the average amount of material evidence (including
dossiers, or chōsho) investigated at trial, and there was a doubling (from 1.5
to 3.0) in the average number of witnesses questioned at trial.176 Similarly,
the percentage of former lay judges who said that trial proceedings,
prosecutors, and defense lawyers were “easy to understand”
(wakariyasukatta) declined markedly.177 In sum, lay judge trials have become
more complicated, time-consuming, and difficult to comprehend. In a
culture that treats lay judges as “guests” and “clients” whose “satisfaction”
must be maximized and “burdens” minimized,178 these issues are the subject
of much media coverage.179

175. Takeda, 2019d. The trial duration and deliberation duration increases occur in both lay
judge trials in which the defendant confesses (jihaku jiken) and in lay judge trials in which the
defendant does not confess (hinin jiken), but the latter increase is especially sharp, with the average
length of a “denial trial” tripling from 4.7 days in 2009 to 14.0 days in 2018. The percentage of all
lay judge trials that are denial trials has increased sharply as well, from roughly 20 percent in 2009,
to more than 40 percent in 2011, to more than 50 percent in 2017 and 2018 (D. Vanoverbeke and
H. Fukurai, Lay Participation in the Criminal Trials of Japan: A Decade of Activity and its SocioPolitical Consequences, in JURIES, LAY JUDGES, AND MIXED COURTS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE,
S. Kuntjak Ivkovic, V. Hans, S. Diamond & N. Marder, eds. (Cambridge University Press,
forthcoming 2020).
176. Some Japanese defense attorneys call this “a shift from paper to people” (authors’
interviews, May 2019).
177. Although there has been a decline in the percentage of lay judges who say that trials,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys are “easy to understand,” lay judges continue to report, as they
have since the new system’s inception, that prosecutors are (by a wide margin) easier to understand
than defense attorneys (Herber, 2019).
178. Takayama, 2019, p. 34.
179. Herber, 2019, p. 182.
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TABLE 5 Duration of Lay Judge Deliberations in Hours, 2009-2018
YEAR

AGGREGATE

CONFESSION

DENIAL

2009

6.6

6.2

7.9

2010

8.4

7.3

10.3

2011

9.4

7.8

11.6

2012

10.3

7.9

13.1

2013

10.5

8.3

12.9

2014

11.2

8.8

13.9

2015

11.9

9.0

15.2

2016

12.1

9.3

15.2

2017

12.6

9.6

15.2

2018

12.9

9.7

15.9

Note: adapted from Supreme Court of Japan, “Report on the State of Implementation
of Lay Judge Trials (from the implementation of the system until the end of May
2019).

But does it matter that lay judge trials are getting longer and more
complicated? On the one hand, this change might be welcomed in light of
the tendency (described above) of prosecutors and judges to script trials in
ways that marginalize the influence of lay participants. On the other hand,
the complexification of lay judge trials could be cause for concern if it
creates incentives for legal professionals to avoid this type of trial. Beyond
some point, trial complexity could even create momentum to expand the
practice of plea bargaining, which Japan legalized for the first time in
2018.180 The present system of plea bargaining allows suspects and defendants
to negotiate deals with prosecutors in exchange for information on other
offenders.181 Although the scope of Japan’s current plea bargaining law is
narrow, it has been criticized for creating incentives for suspects and
defendants to make false and self-serving statements that could lead to
180. See JAPAN TIMES, May 31, 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/05/31/natio
nal/crime-legal/japanese-style-plea-bargaining-debuts-authorities-fear-spread-false-testimony/#.
XbyO9697mM8.
181. S. Murakami, Japanese-style plea bargaining debuts but authorities fear spread of false
testimony, JAPAN TIMES, May 31, 2018.
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wrongful convictions. In the long run, the larger concern is that if lay judge
trials become too long and complicated, the system’s professional
incumbents could try to make it prohibitively costly for defendants to
exercise their right to a lay judge trial, by imposing large “trial taxes” on
them, as routinely happens in the United States.182 It would be ironic if a lay
participation reform that was intended to improve the quality of criminal
trials and the level of public trust in Japanese criminal justice ends up
resembling an American system of “justice without trial” that relies on
giving defendants an “offer that cannot be refused.” 183 Moreover, if lay
judge trials continue to become more complicated, Japanese prosecutors
could become even more cautious about charging cases for trial in this forum,
thereby “hollowing out” a system that many reformers regard as the most
promising and progressive change in Japanese criminal justice in more than
half a century.184
10. Seeing the Forest
Around the time of the 10th anniversary of the lay judge reform, the
Chief Justice of Japan’s Supreme Court (Otani Naoto) said that the new trial
system “needs tweaking” to stimulate greater public interest and to ease the
“burdens” on lay judges and thereby reduce the number of no-shows, but he
also stressed that, all in all, the new trial system “has been accepted
positively by the public” and by lay judges in particular.185 Survey evidence
supports his claims. On the whole, “Japanese people are positive” about the
lay judge system,186 and a survey of 100 former lay judges found that more
than 90 percent support the new system and want to see it maintained.187
Similarly, a Kyodo News survey of 342 former lay judges found that 98
percent had a favorable experience as a lay judge, with 92 percent saying

182.
183.

Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, U. CHI. L. REV., 1978.
Hans Zeisel, The Offer That Cannot Be Refused, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
MATERIALS ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, Franklin E. Zimring
& Richard S. Frase eds. (1980), pp. 559-60.
184. FUTABA IGARASHI, KŌ NAOSANAKEREBA SAIBANIN SAIBAN WA KŪDŌ NI NARU
(Gendaijinbunsha, 2016).
185. Lay Judge System Needs Tweaking, Chief Justice Says, JAPAN TIMES, May 17, 2019, p. 2.
186. Fujita, 2018, p. 275. Note, however, that an NHK opinion survey in April 2019 (n=2819)
found that 28 percent of respondents said they think it was “not good” that the lay judge system
was introduced. When nonresponses are excluded from this survey, the figure rises to 33 percent.
See https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/research/yoron/pdf/20190521_1.pdf.
187. YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Honsha 100nin Chōsa: Saibanin Keikensha 9wari Shiji, May 19,
2019, p. 1.
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“citizen sensibilities” were well reflected in judicial opinions.188 More broadly,
evidence compiled by Japan’s judiciary shows that the vast majority of lay
judges say they had a good experience.189 According to a survey of 5392
citizens who served, 96 percent said their experience was either
“extraordinarily good” (62 percent) or “good” (34 percent), even though
before their experience as a lay judge started, half did not want to
participate.190 This before-after gap in lay judge positivity parallels a similar
before-after disparity among citizens who serve on Prosecution Review
Commissions. One survey of former PRC members found that 70 percent
said that at the time they were selected to serve they “did not really want to
do it” (amari kinori shinakatta), but by the time their six-month period of
service had ended, 96 percent said “it was a good experience” (yoi keiken
datta).191 The evidence from former lay judge and PRC participants suggests
that relaxing the rules of confidentiality that currently restrict them could
encourage greater participation in both systems.
Despite high levels of anxiety in Japanese media and society about the
physical and psychological burdens that lay judges purportedly feel, the
Kyodo News survey found that only 3 percent of former lay judges said their
experience was “very stressful,” while another 31 percent said it was
“somewhat stressful.”192 In our view, the stress of being a lay judge receives
so much attention in Japanese media and society that the secondary aim of
reducing the “burden” of serving threatens to displace the primary aims of
criminal adjudication, such as fairness, justice, and accuracy. 193 More
188. TOKYO SHIMBUN, Hanketsu ni ‘Shimin Kankaku’ 92%, ‘Shinri ni Sutoresu’ 34%, May
21, 2019, p. 1 (Summarizing the Kyodo Results); Mainichi Shimbun, “‘Hanketsu ni Shimin
Kankaku,’” May 21, 2019, p. 1 (Summarizing the Kyodo Results).
189. For data on the first ten years of Japan’s lay judge reform, see http://www.saibanin.
courts.go.jp/topics/09_12_05-10jissi_jyoukyou.html.
190. Herber, 2019, p. 180.
191. Ii, 2019, p. 149.
192. See JAPAN TIMES, May 21, 2019, p. 2, at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/05/21/
national/crime-legal/third-japans-lay-judges-say-experience-stressful-system-viewed-positivelyoverall/#.XbySi697mM8.
193. David T. Johnson, Capital punishment without capital trials in Japan’s lay judge system,
ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL, 8.52 (2010), pp. 1-38; DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE CULTURE OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN JAPAN (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming, 2020), ch.2. For example, after a lay
judge trial in Sendai in 2013, a 62-year-old former lay judge who was diagnosed with Acute Stress
Disorder sued the government for 2 million yen ($20,000), arguing that her lay judge service had
caused the disorder. In a trial in which the defendant (Takahashi Akihiko) was eventually sentenced
to death for murdering a married couple, the lay judges had viewed photos of the corpses and heard
the recorded voices of the victims in an emergency call. According to the lawsuit, the lay judge
vomited on the first day of trial after seeing photos of the crime scene, and she suffered numerous
nightmares and flashbacks thereafter. The legal basis for her claim was that the Lay Judge Law
violates Article 18 of Japan’s Constitution (which forbids “bondage of any kind” and “involuntary
servitude”), and Article 13 (which states that “All of the people shall be respected as individuals”).
Cases such as this fueled calls to remove death-penalty decision-making from the jurisdiction of
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fundamentally, stress is inevitable in many human activities. As Marcus
Aurelius observed, “for a human being to feel stress is normal—if he’s living
a normal human life.”194
Judges had the most to lose because of Japan’s lay judge reform, for
when amateurs participate in criminal adjudication, professionals lose
some control over guilt and sentencing decisions.195 In this context, the
high levels of judicial support for the new trial system are striking. In an
article published on the 10th anniversary of the lay judge reform, Japan’s
largest newspaper reported that all 50 chief judges in the nation’s District
Courts believe that, overall, “the lay judge system has had a good influence”
on Japanese law and society.196 In their view, the reform made trials easier
to understand (47/50 judges), decisions (hanketsu) more persuasive (43/50
judges), and trials shorter (37/50 judges). What is more, 48 of the 50 chief
judges said the lay judge system has been a net “plus” for them as
individuals, because it caused them to think more deeply about law, helped
improve their communication skills, and made them more conscious of
public opinion. A Sankei newspaper interview of 20 other judges revealed
similarly positive views.197
In some respects it is good that judges support the lay judge reform, for
judicial resistance could have undermined the reform—a phenomenon
frequently seen in the United States.198 On the other hand, the extremely
high levels of judicial support for Japan’s lay judge system suggest that this
reform is doing little to make judges uncomfortable. If the point of reform
is to produce meaningful change in Japanese criminal justice, is that a good
thing?199 Similarly, the high level of support among former lay judges seems
better than deep dissatisfaction, but if it is also a sign that judges are

lay judges, but in official reviews of the lay judge reform, this change was not recommended. See
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/08/national/crime-legal/japanese-citizen-judge-suesgovernment-for-mental-suffering/#.XVA2xkd7mM8.
194. MARCUS AURELIUS, MEDITATIONS (The Modern Library, 2003), p. 76. To clarify, we
do not claim that lay judge trials are seldom stressful for the citizens who serve. Moreover, Article
51 of the Lay Judge Law stipulates that judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys should try to
conduct trials in ways that do not impose an “excessive burden” (futan ga kajū na mono) on lay
judges. Our concern is that, in practice, “excessive burden” is too often taken to mean “any burden
at all.” As defense attorney Takashi Takano (2019, p. 29) has argued, if politicians were as
concerned with “stress” as professional judges are, so that they went to great lengths avoid
“burdening” the electorate with excessive information, it would be tantamount to “corrupt and
dangerous government.”
195. Kage, 2017, pp. 10-15.
196. YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Saibanin Seido 10nen: Saibanchō 50nin Ankēto: Shimin Kankaku
Shinri Shinpū, May 21, 2019, pp. 1, 13.
197. SANKEI SHIMBUN, Keikensha Fuereba, Shakai ga Yoku Naru, May 19, 2019, p. 24.
198. Feeley, 1983, Feeley, 2017, and Feeley, 2018.
199. Takano, 2019.
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successfully satisfying their “clients,” 200 hosting their “guests,” 201 and
parenting their “children,” 202 the net effect could be to render lay judges
passive in the criminal process, thereby marginalizing their influence as well.
And let us not miss the forest for the trees. Our essay has focused on the
limits of lay participation by focusing mainly on its effects in the criminal
justice system. But of course, judging these reforms solely in terms of their
effects on criminal justice makes no more sense than evaluating a wedding
or a funeral in terms of its accuracy. 203 As Tocqueville and others have
observed, trials pursue broad and intangible goals, including civic education
and democratization.204 These effects are hard to measure, but the possibility
of positive change in Japan’s society and polity needs to be considered,
especially considering the claims made by some analysts.
As we have seen, survey responses from citizens who served as lay
judges “overwhelmingly indicate that they found the experience rewarding,
empowering, and educational.”205 Based on this evidence, some observers
believe Japan’s new trial system is serving as a “school for democracy.”206
Similarly, research on “lay judge lounges” (saibanin raunji) concludes that
“it is not over when it’s over” because lay judges continue to meet, think,
and talk about their experiences long after their service has ended.207 Other
analysts regard Japan’s lay judge reform as “monumental” because of its
“indirect” and “educational” effects on Japanese society.208 On this view,
the lay judge system is “the greatest achievement” of justice system
reform in Japan, 209 and lay participation should be extended into other
realms of Japanese law.210 These optimistic interpretations presume that lay
participation fosters the civic consciousness of citizens about state affairs
and provides citizens with an unprecedented platform for monitoring state
action and holding state actors accountable.211
We are skeptical. For one thing, there is no solid or systematic evidence
that lay participation is reshaping Japanese society and democracy. For
200. Herber, 2019, p. 182.
201. Takayama, 2019, p. 34.
202. Takano, 2019.
203. SADAKAT KADRI, THE TRIAL: FOUR THOUSAND YEARS OF COURTROOM DRAMA
(Random House, 2005), p. 346.
204. JOHN GASTIL, E. PIERRE DEESS, PHILIP J. WEISER, AND CINDY SIMMONS, THE JURY AND
DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION (Oxford University Press, 2010).
205. Kage, 2017, p. 6.
206. Kage, 2017, p. 6.
207. Takayuki II, Anata mo Ashita wa Saibanin!? (Nihon Hyōronsha, 2019).
208. Wilson, 2017.
209. Fukurai, 2013, p. 565.
210. Wilson, Fukurai, and Maruta, 2015.
211. Vanoverbeke and Fukurai, forthcoming, 2020.

6 - Johnson

482

7/29/2020 10:19 AM

Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment

[Vol. 1:3

another, the high no-show rate for citizens who are asked to serve as
lay judges hardly reflects an enthusiastic societal endorsement of
citizen involvement in government.212 There is also the matter of scale and
plausibility. A little yeast can have a large effect, but if lay judge service in
Japan is “resulting in a greater sense of civic engagement by those who have
experienced it, the numbers”—about 12,000 persons serve as lay judges each
year, or less than 1 Japanese adult in 8,500—“remain so small it is likely
to take many years before the impact will become visible”—if it
becomes visible at all.213 By comparison, approximately 1.5 million people
are selected each year to serve on a jury in an American state court, which is
about 1 American adult in 150.214 Per capita, therefore, jury service in the
United States appears to be at least 50 times more common than lay judge
service in Japan (8,500/150 = 56.7), even though jury trials are “vanishing”
and perhaps even “dying” in the U.S.215 There is some evidence that in
America “jury deliberation promotes civic engagement and political
participation,” but the effects are small and, for the most part, are limited to
people who were not civically engaged or politically active before serving as
jurors.216 The main finding from the best American research is that jury
service generates a 4 percent to 7 percent increase in average voter turnout
for jurors who previously had “a relatively spotty voting record.”217 And the
effect of criminal jury participation on voting “does not hold for those voters
who are already active.”218
The small size and narrow scope of the jury service effect in the United
States is hardly a solid basis for making bold pronouncements about the
democratizing effects of lay judge service in Japan. In our view, Japan’s lay
judge service rate is so low that a more realistic prediction would be little
effect of lay judge service on voting behavior (and on other civic activities)
because the 20 percent of citizens who are asked to serve and actually do are
probably already active in civic affairs. We join the call for researchers to
collect data on the relationships between lay participation and civic
engagement in Japan.219 But until we see evidence to the contrary, we will
continue to believe in the null hypothesis.

212. Herber, 2019, ch.6.
213. Foote, 2014, p. 14.
214. Mona Chalabi, 2015, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-are-the-chances-of-servin
g-on-a-jury/.
215. Robert P. Burns, 2009.
216. Gastil, Deess, Weiser, and Simmons, 2010, pp. 173-176.
217. Gastil et al., 2010, p. 48.
218. Gastil et al., 2010, p. 48, emphasis added.
219. Fujita, 2018, pp. 273-275.
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Conclusion
Many of the limits of criminal justice reform in Japan can be seen in
other countries. In these respects, Japan seems to be an ordinary country and
a fairly typical case. 220 And compared to criminal justice reform in the
United States, Japan’s attempts to implement lay participation can be called
a qualified success, for they have led to real change in many criminal justice
procedures, and they have not made many things worse. In Japan this “glass
half full” perspective is so common among legal professionals and scholars
of law and society that we consider it the Orthodox View. Yet in evaluating
Japan’s lay participation reforms, using the U.S. as the main point of
comparison seems to be setting the bar rather low.221 And when it comes to
the substance of Japanese reform, there is striking continuity in both who
wields control in the criminal process and in who gets what from it. This
view might be called “the glass half-empty,” except we believe this label is
too cheerful too, as the previous pages have explained. I n many important
respects—prosecution, sentencing, capital punishment, victims, and so on—
changes on the surface of Japanese criminal justice have affected reality on
a deeper level by cementing the status quo. We originally planned to call
this article “Two Cheers for Criminal Justice Reform in Japan,” but after
analyzing the evidence we changed the title because we could muster only
enough enthusiasm for a single, highly qualified cheer.
The limits of reform in Japanese criminal justice should not be surprising.
After all, the main aim of the lay judge reform was not to transform the
distribution of power in Japanese criminal justice or to radically reshape
Japan’s criminal justice outcomes. Moreover, references to democracy and
popular sovereignty do not even appear in the Lay Judge Law. As stated in
Article 1 of that Law, the primary purpose of the lay judge reform is to
promote public understanding of the judicial system and thereby raise
confidence in it. As one scholar put it, the lay judge system “was established
to enhance the power and authority of the judiciary,” not to democratize it.222
In the context of these conservative ambitions and the almost perennial
control of national government by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party,
the limits of Japan’s lay participation reforms may have been all but
inevitable. For Japanese progressives the main message of criminal justice
reform might be that nothing fails like success.
Understanding the present also requires remembering the past. Lay
participation reforms have been marginalized several times in Japanese
220. John D. Jackson & Nikolai P. Kovalev, Lay Adjudication in Europe: The Rise and Fall of
the Traditional Jury, ONATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES, Volume 6, No. 2 (2016), pp. 368-395.
221. Feeley, 2018.
222. Yamase, 2016, p. 334.
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history, mostly by legal professionals who found their powers threatened
by greater citizen involvement.223 This legacy is prominent not only with
respect to lay judges, victims, and prosecution review commissioners. It is
evident in other reforms that were meant to enhance the role of
“outsiders” in Japanese criminal justice, 224 including the Penal Institution
Visiting Committees (keiji shisetsu shisatsu iinkai) that began operating in
Japanese prisons and jails in 2007. Prison inmates in Japan are sometimes
now able to read and write uncensored letters, and they can be interviewed
by PIVC members without prison or jail staff present. These are welcome
changes, but the main effect of this reform has been to strengthen support for
traditional penal practices—to make them more legitimate by making them
seem more democratic.225 Ultimately, Penal Institution Visiting Committees
represent reform in the service of conservative interests. This is also a theme
of the story we have just told.
This article has several implications for future research on criminal
justice reform in Japan, the first three of which are important but prosaic:
study the law in action, not just the law on the books; do not conflate process
and substance, for change in the former might be little more than incidental
music; and be skeptical of strong claims about large positive effects, because
criminal justice reform is hard. Future studies should also try to explain how
the cultural and structural contexts of Japanese criminal justice constrain
citizen influence and reform outcomes. And most importantly, future
research on criminal justice reform in Japan should pay more attention to the
crucial roles played by police in “making crime” through their
investigations226 and by prosecutors in shaping “the Japanese way of justice”
through their charge decisions.227 Describing criminal trials in Japan with
little regard for the discretionary decisions that police and prosecutors make
in the pre-trial process makes no more sense than explaining the triple
disaster of March 11, 2011 without regard for the “site fights” that occurred

223. Anderson and Nolan, 2004. The most important historical instance of the marginalization
of lay participation by Japanese legal professionals was the prewar jury system, which operated
from 1928 to 1943 (Vanoverbeke, 2015, pp. 60-87). On the whole, that system was conceived by
state authorities to control citizens, not to control state action through citizen participation. See N.
Toshitani, Nihon no Baishinhō: Sono Naiyō to Jisshi Katei no Mondaiten [The Jury Act in Japan:
Problems with Content and Operation], JIYŪ TO SEIGI, 35 (1984), pp. 4-12.
224. Herber, 2019.
225. Stacey Steele, Carol Lawson, Mari Hirayama, and David T. Johnson, Lay Participation
in Japanese Criminal Justice: Prosecution Review Commissions, the Lay Judge System, and Penal
Institution Visitation Committees, ASIAN JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIETY (forthcoming 2020).
226. SETSUO MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN: A STUDY ON MAKING CRIME (SUNY Press,
1992).
227. DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN
(Oxford University Press, 2002).
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around the issue of where to locate nuclear reactors228 or for the regulatory
failures that preceded and enabled the nuclear meltdowns in Fukushima.229
If information is the currency of democracy, then Japanese citizens (and law
and society scholars) lack a key to the treasury of truths concerning these
important but neglected law enforcement officials.230
Finally, we have argued that the past is not dead in Japanese criminal
justice, and that it is not even past (recall William Faulkner). For a country
that has been ruled by a conservative political party almost continuously
since it was founded in 1955, perhaps this is a conclusion Japan-watchers
should have expected?

228. Daniel P. Aldrich, The crucial role of civil society in disaster recovery and Japan’s
preparedness for emergencies, JAPAN AKTUELL, 3 (2008), pp. 81-96.
229. Jeff Kingston, Japan's Nuclear Village, ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL, Volume 10, Issue 37,
No. 1 (2012), https://apjjf.org/2012/10/37/Jeff-Kingston/3822/article.html.
230. On Japanese police, see David T. Johnson, Policing in Japan, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK
OF MODERN JAPANESE STUDIES, James D. Babb ed. (Sage, 2015), pp. 222-243. And on Japanese
prosecutors, see David T. Johnson, Japan’s Prosecution System, in PROSECUTORS AND POLITICS:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, Michael Tonry ed. (Crime and Justice: A Review of Research,
University of Chicago Press, Volume 41, 2012), pp. 35-74.

